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ARTICLE

Kiobel, Extraterritoriality, and the ―Global
War on Terror‖
CRAIG MARTIN†

ABSTRACT

For the purpose of exploring the issues of extraterritoriality
raised in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., this project sought to
examine how the federal courts have considered extraterritoriality in
cases arising in the so-called “global war on terror” (GWOT). The
inquiry leads to some new and arguably important observations
about extraterritoriality in the GWOT policies and related
jurisprudence.
The plaintiffs in Kiobel claimed, under the Alien Tort Statute
(ATS), that the defendant corporations were liable for complicity in
Nigeria‟s conduct of indefinite detention, torture, and extrajudicial
killing. The U.S. Supreme Court departed from the issue of corporate
liability under international law to question whether the ATS, when
invoked in cases involving foreign litigants for conduct abroad (socalled “foreign-cubed” cases), was an extraterritorial exercise of
jurisdiction, in violation of domestic presumptions or international
law principles on jurisdiction. The move was surprising because the
application of the ATS is arguably a permissible exercise of
adjudicative jurisdiction, rather than an impermissible exercise of
prescriptive or enforcement jurisdiction.
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In exploring this move in Kiobel this Article set out to examine
how the federal courts have approached issues of extraterritoriality
in claims of indefinite detention, torture, and extrajudicial killing
arising in response to the GWOT. This inquiry suggests that the
government conduct giving rise to these GWOT cases itself
constituted the extraterritorial exercise of U.S. prescriptive and
enforcement jurisdiction in foreign territory. Moreover, in many
instances the conduct was arguably undertaken without clear
congressionial approval or other legal authority, and was thus likely
in violation of both the international law principles limiting the
exercise of domestic jurisdiction abroad, and the domestic
presumption against extraterritoriality.
The second observation arising from the inquiry is that the
courts, the relevant bar, and the academy have not acknowledged or
sufficiently examined the extent to which this government conduct
was an extraterritorial application of U.S. law and policy. Rather, all
the focus, by both the courts and the academy, is on whether U.S.
rights can apply extraterritorially to protect the foreign claimants in
these cases. Strictly limiting the extraterritorial application of U.S.
legal rights, the courts have not questioned the application of U.S.
law and policy that gave rise to those rights claims in the first place.
There is also a stark contrast between the manner in which the
courts apply standards, canons of statutory construction, and various
doctrines, in legitimizing the government conduct and immunizing
U.S. defendants from claims on the one hand, and in limiting the
availability of U.S. legal rights, and operation of the ATS itself, on
the other hand. Moreover, with respect to the key issue of nexus,
which is core to the decision in Kiobel, the courts seem to apply very
different standards.
The Article explores some of the arguments for why the U.S.
conduct in these GWOT cases is not impermissibly extraterritorial,
and thus why the courts ought not be concerned. But even if in the
specifics of each case the doctrinal treatment is correct, given the
contrast between the approach of the Court to extraterritoriality in
Kiobel to that of the courts in the GWOT cases, it is argued that the
issues nonetheless deserve more analysis and debate. While Kiobel
may have left the ATS dead to claimants in foreign-cubed cases, it
may lead to renewed inquiry into the legitimacy of the extraterritorial
exercise of U.S. jurisdiction in the GWOT.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.1 generated a great deal of
interest even before it was argued in the U.S. Supreme Court, and
much more will be written about it in the wake of the Court‘s rather
surprising judgment. Much of the analysis will focus on whether
anything remains of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS),2 what impact the
case will have on international human rights, and the extent to which
the opinions in the judgment, and particularly their discussion of
extraterritoriality, are consistent with prior ATS jurisprudence. This
Article, written for a symposium on the case held after oral argument
at the Supreme Court but prior to the judgment,3 began as an inquiry
1. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
3. While this volume is being published after the judgment was rendered, and some
revisions were permitted in light of the judgment, the symposium was held, and the bulk of
the writing was done, before the case was decided.
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into some of these questions, with a focus on the extraterritoriality
issue. The Court‘s inquiry into that issue was surprising, because
there are some good reasons to think that the ATS does not give rise
to impermissibly extraterritorial exercises of U.S. jurisdiction. The
research for this Article thus began by looking at how the federal
courts have treated extraterritoriality in other cases involving the
kinds of human rights violations raised in Kiobel, particularly in the
context of the so-called ―global war on terror‖ (GWOT). The idea
was that such an examination might provide some insights into why
and how the Court had focused on the issue of extraterritoriality in
Kiobel. But in the end, the examination of those cases through the
lens of the Court‘s treatment of extraterritoriality in Kiobel leads to
some potentially new and important observations regarding how
extraterritoriality is understood in the context of the GWOT.
In short, the first observation is that the U.S. conduct giving rise
to the GWOT cases itself constitutes extraterritorial exercises of U.S.
jurisdiction. In many cases this conduct lacks sufficiently clear
congressionial or other relevant legal authority, which suggests that
such conduct may violate domestic presumptions against
extraterritoriality, and international law principles on jurisdiction.
Yet, the courts, and the academy, have focused on whether U.S. legal
rights and other protections can be applied extraterritorially to benefit
such claimants, while apparently ignoring the fact that the policy
against which they seek protection is itself an extraterritorial exercise
of U.S. jurisdiction. Moreover, there is a stark contrast in how the
courts have applied standards and relevant doctrine when considering
the authority for U.S. conduct in the GWOT, as compared to the strict
standards and doctrine applied in both Kiobel itself, and in the
consideration of the rights claims of foreign claimants in the GWOT.
By way of background, Kiobel was an ATS class action in which
the plaintiffs argued that the defendant corporations were liable for
torture, crimes against humanity, extrajudicial killing, arbitrary
detention, and other violations of international law committed by
agents of the government of Nigeria.4 The ATS provides federal
courts with jurisdiction to adjudicate tort claims made by foreigners
for the violation of a narrow range of well-established principles of
international law.5 While enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789,
the ATS was virtually unheard of until it was first employed to

4. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662–63.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 41–45.
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advance human rights claims in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala.6 In Filártiga,
the family of a Paraguayan national, who had been tortured to death
in Paraguay, won redress against the responsible former government
agent for the tort arising from the violation of the international law
prohibition against torture.7
The narrow issue on appeal to the Supreme Court in Kiobel was
whether corporations had sufficient legal personality under
international law to be held liable for such violations.8 But in the
course of oral argument the Court deviated from that narrow issue to
delve more deeply into fundamental questions about the scope of the
ATS, and whether its operation is an impermissible extraterritorial
application of U.S. law.9 The Court ordered a briefing of these new
issues and reargument of the case several months later.10 In
particular, the Court questioned whether ATS claims made by
foreigners for the conduct of other foreigners, perpetrated within
foreign territory (so-called ―foreign-cubed‖ cases), constituted an
extraterritorial application of U.S. law in violation of the domestic
presumption against extraterritoriality and the international law
principles governing jurisdiction.11 Thus, the central issue of
corporate liability under international law was shunted to one side,
and extraterritoriality under international law and the legitimate scope
of the ATS became the focus of the case.12 In the course of argument
and reargument it became clear that the continued validity of a whole
line of ATS cases involving the conduct of foreign actors abroad,
stretching back to the seminal case of Filártiga itself, might be in
jeopardy.
In the final result, in which the plaintiffs‘ claims were dismissed,
6. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
7. Id. at 878.
8. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663.
9. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491) (argued
February 28, 2012); Transcript of Oral Reargument, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491)
(argued October 1, 2012).
10. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738 (2012) (mem.).
11. See infra Parts II.A–B.
12. There is a certain irony in this. The Court did much the same thing, deviating from
the issue on appeal and ordering reargument, in Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310
(2010), in which of course the Court held that corporations enjoyed some of the same
constitutional rights as natural persons. There would have been further irony had the Court in
Kiobel held that corporations do not, however, enjoy sufficient legal personality to be held
liable for violations of international law.
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the majority grounded its decision in the domestic law presumption
against extraterritoriality,13 while the concurring minority focused on
the international law principles on jurisdiction.14 The domestic law
presumption against extraterritoriality was itself founded on a respect
for international law principles on jurisdiction, and thus, while
differing in focus, the overall judgment was grounded in the
relationship between the ATS and the international legal system. This
apparent concern about extraterritoriality seems somewhat strange, in
part because the application of the ATS in Kiobel is, arguably,
entirely consistent with the Court‘s own interpretation of the
relationship between the statute and international law in its seminal
ATS decision Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.15 Moreover, the
interpretation of that relationship in Sosa is itself consistent with
international law principles on jurisdiction.
Reasonable people can and do disagree on this. There will
continue to be much debate over the technical arguments regarding
extraterritoriality, and the international law principles governing
jurisdiction as they relate to this case. But given that there are
reasonable arguments that the application of the ATS in foreigncubed cases, such as Kiobel, would be consistent with Sosa and
international law principles, it was surprising for the Court to depart
from the corporate liability issue in order to raise the issue of
extraterritoriality. The Court‘s focus on extraterritoriality leads
naturally to an inquiry into how the Supreme Court, and other federal
courts, have treated issues of extraterritoriality and respect for
international law principles on jurisdiction in other cases that involve
claims similar to those raised in Kiobel—that is, claims arising from
the violations of international law principles that form jus cogens
norms, and which are recognized under Sosa as grounding ATS
claims. Such an inquiry leads one to wonder how, for instance, the
courts have considered extraterritoriality and compliance with the
international law principles on jurisdiction in cases involving claims
similar to those raised in Kiobel, but arising in response to U.S.
conduct in the GWOT.
This Article set out to explore that line of inquiry. But what
began as an inquiry aimed at providing insights into the Court‘s
approach in Kiobel, developed into more of an examination of this

13. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
14. Id. at 1673–74 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
15. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
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sample of GWOT cases through the lens of the Court‘s treatment of
extraterritoriality in Kiobel. Rather than the GWOT cases shedding
light on Kiobel, thinking about the approach towards
extraterritoriality in Kiobel provided some insights into our
understanding of GWOT jurisprudence. In particular, the inquiry
revealed some important and surprising features regarding an
apparent failure to address the issue of extraterritoriality in the
context of the GWOT. The most important observation is that the
actions of the government of the United States against suspected
terrorists, specifically policies of indefinite detention, enhanced
interrogation techniques, extraordinary rendition and torture, and
even targeted killing, itself constituted an extraterritorial application
of U.S. law. Moreover, at times such conduct was, arguably,
undertaken without clear congressionial approval or other relevant
legal authority. As will be explored below, it is arguably the case that
in many of these instances none of the Authorization for Use of
Military Force (AUMF)16 enacted shortly after the 9/11 attacks, or
any other U.S. legislation, or indeed the international law of armed
conflict, can be said to clearly authorize the U.S. actions. This would
suggest that in some cases at least, the conduct was an impermissibly
extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction.
A second and related observation, is that the federal courts
(including the Supreme Court), the litigants themselves, and even the
scholars writing on the GWOT jurisprudence, have not sufficiently
recognized the extent to which the government action in relation to
these claimants constitutes an extraterritorial exercise of U.S.
jurisdiction. Given the Court‘s questions and analysis in Kiobel, one
would have expected that some inquiry would have been required in
several of these GWOT cases into whether the government conduct
in detaining, interrogating, or targeting the claimants represented an
impermissible exercise of U.S. jurisdiction abroad. Yet there was
none. Indeed, when the federal courts have dealt with issues of
extraterritoriality in the context of rights claims made in GWOT
cases, the focus has been almost exclusively on whether rights under
U.S. law can be extended abroad. Scholarship too has focused
narrowly on this debate. Thus, while everyone is preoccupied with
the possibility and extent of extraterritorial application of rights, there
16. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1541
note (2006)).
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has been no corresponding judicial concern or even inquiry into how
those very rights claims, many of them advanced under the ATS,
sought protection against the extraterritorial application of U.S. law.
Indeed, neither the jurisprudence nor the related academic literature,
nor even the lawyers for the claimants, seem to have recognized this
somewhat paradoxical feature of several of these GWOT cases.
A third observation is that there is a rather stark contrast between
the generous and expansive approach of the federal courts in
accepting the legitimacy of the government conduct in the GWOT on
the one hand, and on the other hand the strict and narrow approach
taken by the courts in dealing with the rights claims of the plaintiffs
in the GWOT cases, and indeed by the Court in its analysis of
extraterritoriality in Kiobel. This contrast is reflected in the different
approaches to statutory interpretation taken by the courts in assessing
congressionial intent and legal authority for government conduct, in
the manner in which doctrine is employed, and perhaps most
markedly in how the concept of nexus is developed and applied. One
of the central arguments that is advanced for the rejection of foreigncubed ATS cases is that there is not a sufficient connection to the
United States. It was indeed an element of the Court‘s judgment in
Kiobel.17 The suggestion of such arguments being that the courts
would be, and indeed should be, more open to adjudicating cases
involving torture and other violations of jus cogens norms if the
defendants were U.S. nationals, or there was otherwise a strong
connection to the United States. But in several GWOT cases, in
which American actors were defendants accused of such violations of
international law, the courts have invoked and creatively extended
various doctrines to block precisely such claims against the U.S.
defendants.18 In contrast, the courts accept the most tenuous
arguments of attenuated links to al-Qaeda, on scant and often dubious
evidence, as grounds for detaining and interrogating claimants in the
GWOT cases.19
This Article begins in
international law principles
jurisdiction, as well as the
extraterritoriality. It explores
why the ATS is arguably

Part
on
U.S.
how
not

II with an explanation of the
the exercise of extraterritorial
domestic law presumptions on
the ATS operates, and explains
an extraterritorial exercise of

17. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669; see also id. at 1671, 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring in the
judgment).
18. See infra Part III.C.
19. See infra Part III.B.
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prescriptive jurisdiction. Given that the Court thought otherwise in
Kiobel, this gives rise to the question of how the courts have treated
extraterritoriality in the context of the GWOT cases. Part III turns to
that inquiry, beginning with an examination of how the sole concern
over extraterritoriality in the GWOT cases has focused on questions
of whether, and the extent to which, U.S. legal rights may be
extended to foreigners abroad. It then moves to examine the cases
involving claims of arbitrary detention, interrogation and torture, and
extrajudicial killing, exploring in each case how the U.S. conduct
arguably constitutes an exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction in
violation of both international law principles on jurisdiction, and the
domestic law presumptions against extraterritoriality. Moreover, the
examination highlights the contrast between standards and doctrines
employed by the courts depending upon which party‘s rights and
privileges are at issue. Finally, in Part IV, the Article takes up some
of the likely objections to this line of argument. It examines in turn
whether the U.S. conduct can be explained as being authorized by the
international law of armed conflict; whether it fits within the
exceptions to the international law principles on jurisdiction; and
whether it was in any event explicitly authorized by Congress, or
alternatively was an exercise of the president‘s Commander-in-Chief
powers, such that the domestic presumptions against
extraterritoriality are rebutted.
In the end, this brief exploration of how the courts have
considered extraterritoriality in the context of the GWOT cases
suggests a troubling disregard for U.S. violations of international law
principles prohibiting the extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction (in
addition, of course, to the violation of international human rights law,
which is the focus of much GWOT scholarship), which the Court
purports to be concerned about in Kiobel. The Article begins by
raising questions as to whether the Court was wrong in its analysis of
the ATS and extraterritoriality in Kiobel, but it does not try to use the
GWOT cases to make that argument; rather, in examining the GWOT
cases through the lens of Kiobel, it suggests that we need to look
more closely at how extraterritoriality has been ignored in the GWOT
context. I cannot, within the scope of this Article, establish
conclusively the pattern of disregard that I begin to examine here—
but this brief exploration of such patterns does raise questions about
such disregard, which I argue is worth further consideration and
analysis.
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II. THE ATS AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW
One of the Court‘s primary issues during oral argument was
whether the operation of the ATS in foreign-cubed cases violates the
international law principles on jurisdiction, or was barred by the
domestic presumption against extraterritoriality. I suggested above
that the ATS, as it was interpreted by the Court in Sosa v. AlvarezMachain,20 is consistent with those principles, even when employed
in foreign-cubed cases. Several other articles in this Volume provide
a more detailed analysis of precisely why this is so, but to provide the
basis for the discussion of the GWOT cases, I begin with a quick
review of the foundation for this proposition.
A.

International Law Principles on Jurisdiction

The principles of both public and private international law
relating to jurisdiction reflect the desire to minimize conflicts
between the laws of sovereign nations. Jurisdiction is a fundamental
component of sovereignty, and to the extent it is exercised in relation
to events or persons outside of the state‘s territory, there is a risk that
it will infringe the sovereignty of another state. From the perspective
of international law, the state‘s exercise of jurisdiction can be
understood as having three aspects, namely: (1) prescriptive
jurisdiction, which relates to the creation and operation of laws; (2)
adjudicative jurisdiction which relates to the operation of judicial
powers in interpreting and applying the law in resolution of disputes;
and (3) enforcement jurisdiction, which relates to the conduct of the
executive powers of the state in enforcing the laws and policies of the
nation.21 Much of the controversy over extraterritoriality relates to the
exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction in relation to conduct abroad—
the passage of laws that purport to govern conduct and persons
outside of the territory of the state—and it is prescriptive jurisdiction
that is at the heart of understanding the extraterritoriality issue in
Kiobel.
The starting presumption is that jurisdiction is territorial (the
territorial principle), in that a state is entitled to exercise all three
forms of jurisdiction without question within its own territory, and
that there will be no interference within its territory by the exercise of

20. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
21. See JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE‘S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
ch. 21 (8th ed. 2012) (explaining the international law principles relating to jurisdiction).
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any other state‘s jurisdiction. In essence, international law may be
said to generally limit the exercise of jurisdiction to the territory of
the state, and to thus prohibit the exercise of prescriptive and
enforcement jurisdiction in relation to conduct beyond the territory of
the state, with some exceptions—some universally accepted, others
controversial.22 The most clearly established exception is that states
may exercise jurisdiction, even in relation to conduct or events
outside its territory, in respect of its own nationals (the nationality
principle). A second relatively well-established, if narrow, exception
is that international law recognizes the right to exercise jurisdiction in
situations requiring a legislative response to protect the state from a
grave national security threat to the institutions of the state (the
protective principle).23
Less widely accepted but asserted in particular by the United
States, is the right of states to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction to
govern conduct abroad that is intended to have and does have
significant effects within the territory of the state (the effects doctrine
or objective territoriality principle).24 Even less well accepted, and
more controversial, is the exercise of jurisdiction to address situations
abroad in which the state‘s nationals are victims of crime (the passive

22. In a number of amicus briefs filed in Kiobel this proposition was challenged on the
basis of the judgment in S.S. ―Lotus‖ (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7), in
which the Permanent Court of International Justice held that international law permits any
exercise of jurisdiction within its territory in respect of conduct abroad that is not explicitly
prohibited. The central holding of the case has been widely criticized, and contradicted in
such later I.C.J. opinions as Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.),
2002 I.C.J. 3, 78 (Feb. 14) (joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, &
Buergenthal) and Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J.
3, at 169 (Feb. 14) (dissenting opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert). See IAN BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 301–03 (4th ed. 1990). But see CRAWFORD,
supra note 21, at 458.
23. BROWNLIE, supra note 22, at 304; CRAWFORD, supra note 21, at 462; see also
Research in International Law, Harvard Law School, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime:
Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT‘L L. 435, 439 (Supp.
1935) [hereinafter Harvard Draft Convention]; Christopher W. Robbins, Finding Terrorists‟
Intent: Aligning Civil Antiterrorism Law with National Security, 83 ST. JOHN‘S L. REV. 1201,
1213–30 (2009).
24. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 402(1)(c) (1987); see also Robbins, supra note 23; Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional
Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Terrorism and the Intersection of National and
International Law, 48 HARV. INT‘L. L.J. 121, 128 (2007); Jason Jarvis, Comment, A New
Paradigm for the Alien Tort Statute Under Extraterritoriality and the Universality Principle,
30 PEPP. L. REV. 671, 709 n. 252 (2003).
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personality principle).25
Finally, there is the conceptually distinct exception provided for
in the principle of universal jurisdiction, which was also central to
arguments advanced in Kiobel. This exception is well-established, but
its scope and application remain in dispute.26 In essence, it provides
that states may exercise jurisdiction in respect of violations of certain
principles of international law, typically jus cogens norms of
customary international law such as the prohibitions against torture,
war crimes, crimes against humanity, piracy, and trading in slaves.27
Universal jurisdiction with respect to some violations is conferred by
treaty, as with the Convention Against Torture,28 while jurisdiction
over other violations is understood to exist as a matter of customary
international law. Interestingly, U.S. courts have not accepted that
terrorism is an international crime for which states may exercise
universal jurisdiction.29
I will return to the substance and scope of some of these
principles later, when I examine possible justifications for the
extraterritorial exercises of jurisdiction that give rise to the GWOT

25. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 402 cmt. g (1987); see also MARY ELLEN O‘CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 828–29
(2d ed. 1970); Geoffrey Watson, The Passive Personality Principle, 28 TEX. INT‘L L.J. 1,
14–30 (1993); Joshua Robinson, United States Practice Penalizing International Terrorists
Needlessly Undercuts Its Opposition to the Passive Personality Principle, 16 B.U. INT‘L L.J.
487 (1998).
26. Aside from open disputes as to when and for what offenses it may be available, there
are some subtly different interpretations or understandings of the precise meaning of
universal jurisdiction. Some argue that it constitutes the exercise of adjudicative jurisdiction
by states in relation to violations of international law. See, e.g., Anthony J. Colangelo, The
Legal Limits of Universal Jurisdiction, 47 VA. J. INT‘L L. 149 (2006). Others, such as
Brownlie, suggest that it is more accurately the application of domestic (municipal) law to
proscribe and punish acts that are also unlawful under international law, and in respect of
which international law confers a liberty upon states to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction.
BROWNLIE, supra note 22, at 304–06.
27. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 404 (1987).
28. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; see also R v. Bow
Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), [2000] 1 A.C.
147 (H.L.) 198–201 (Browne-Wilkinson, L.J.), 204–05 (Millett, L.J.).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 105–06 (2d Cir. 2003). But see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404 (1987)
(defining ―Universal Jurisdiction to Define and Punish Certain Offenses‖ to include ―perhaps
certain acts of terrorism‖). See generally Leila Sadat, Universal Jurisdiction: Myths,
Realities, and Prospects: Redefining Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 241
(2001); Colangelo, supra note 24.
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cases.30
B.

The Domestic Presumptions

Separate from the operation of the international law principles,
but relevant to the question of whether the ATS constitutes an
impermissibly extraterritorial application of U.S. law, are two
presumptions in U.S. domestic law. The first is the presumption
against extraterritoriality, which is traced back to Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.31 in
1909. According to this doctrine, Congress is presumed not to intend
statutes to apply extraterritorially, and thus courts will interpret
legislation as having no extraterritorial application, unless Congress
has explicitly expressed in the statute the intention that it apply
outside U.S. territory.32 The corollary to this is that if Congress
explicitly provides that some statutory provision is to have
extraterritorial application, then the courts will interpret it
accordingly, regardless of whether doing so would be inconsistent
with international law principles on jurisdiction. In other words, the
presumption is only triggered when the government purports to apply
a statute to conduct or persons overseas, and that statute is silent or
ambiguous on the issue of extraterritorial effect. Such is the theory,
but of course it is not quite so clear-cut in practice. The courts have
often found an implicit congressionial intention to have the law
applied extraterritorially, if such application is thought necessary to
fully achieve the objectives of the law.33
The second presumption is referred to by the name of the
nineteenth-century case in which it was established, Murray v.
Schooner Charming Betsy.34 According to the Charming Betsy
doctrine, an act of Congress is not to be construed in a manner
inconsistent with international law, so long as any other interpretation
is possible.35 As with the presumption against extraterritoriality, a
law will be construed in a manner that would put the United States in

30. Infra Part IV.B.
31. 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909).
32. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922); United States v. VasquezVelasco, 15 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 1994); see infra note 220 and accompanying text.
34. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
35. Id. at 118.
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violation of international law if Congress has explicitly expressed the
intent that the statute operate notwithstanding any inconsistency with
international law. Put simply, under either presumption, the courts
will give effect to statutes that violate the obligations of the United
States under international law if it is clearly the intent of Congress to
do so; but both presumptions were developed on the judicial
understanding that generally Congress is presumed to respect, and to
comply with, the principles of international law.
The majority opinion in Kiobel held that the presumption against
extraterritoriality applied to the ATS, and that there was insufficient
evidence to support the notion that Congress had intended the ATS to
apply to the conduct of foreigners occurring in foreign territory.36
The concurring opinion of Justice Breyer, on the other hand, focused
its attention on the international law principles regarding jurisdiction,
and only agreed in the result based on the notion that there had to be
a sufficient nexus to the interests of the U.S. to justify the exercise of
jurisdiction.37 In considering the operation of the ATS, and the nature
of the extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction in the GWOT cases, I
will consider both domestic and international law principles, though
the emphasis will be on the international law principles.
C. The Jurisdictional Operation of the ATS
The question raised by the Court in Kiobel was whether the
ATS, at least when applied in so-called foreign-cubed cases, would
constitute an extraterritorial exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction,
either in violation of the domestic law presumptions, or the principles
of international law regarding jurisdiction. The ATS provides that
―the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States.‖38 It was argued by the
defendants, and the governments of several states that filed amicus
briefs,39 that the ATS constitutes the application of U.S. substantive

36. 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
37. Id. at 1671, 1673–78 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
39. See, e.g., Brief of the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Kingdom of the Netherlands as Amici Curiae in Support of the
Respondents, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491); Brief of the Governments of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491); Brief of
the European Commission on Behalf of the European Union Supporting Neither Party,
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (No. 10-1491).
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and remedial law to conduct in another country, and to nationals of
foreign states,40 which is an exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction that
cannot be justified by any of the principles of jurisdiction discussed
above. But that position is arguably not consistent with the Court‘s
own interpretation of the ATS in Sosa, nor with a line of lower court
judgments stretching back to Filártiga.
Sosa is most noted for the narrow limits it placed on the kind of
international law violations that could ground a claim, but it also
addressed the jurisdiction courts would exercise in adjudicating those
claims. Beginning with the limits, the Court established that the ATS
provided the district courts with jurisdiction to adjudicate cases
involving violations of a very narrow sub-set of principles of
customary international law (leaving aside the issue of treaties of the
United States).41 That is, claims could only be made in respect of
violations of those customary norms that are as well-established,
clearly defined, and widely accepted today, as the specific crimes
against the law of nations that had been in the contemplation of
Congress in 1789, when the statute was enacted.42 Moreover, the
better reading of Sosa suggests that the Court was also limiting the
scope of the ATS to those principles of customary international law
which are understood to give rise to individual liability or culpability
in international law.43 The range of international law principles that
the Court identified as falling within the scope of the ATS maps
nicely onto the short list of customary international law norms that
are most universally accepted as comprising jus cogens norms,
namely: torture, piracy, a sub-set of war crimes, crimes against
humanity, genocide, trading in slaves, and perhaps the crime of
aggression.44
The Court in Sosa also clarified the jurisdictional nature of the
40. See Transcript of Oral Reargument, supra note 9, at 34–35; Supplemental Brief of
the United States as Amicus Curiae in Partial Support of Affirmance at 2, Kiobel, 133 S. Ct.
1659 (No. 10-1491).
41. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004).
42. Id.
43. This inference flows in part from the cases discussed by Justice Souter, which refer
to violations that are ―heinous actions‖ that violate universal norms and that are ―actionable.‖
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732.
44. See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 22, at 512–15; Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy
in International Law, 100 AM. J. INT‘L L. 291 (2006); Jarvis, supra note 24, at 693
(discussing jus cogens norms).
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ATS. It rejected arguments advanced by the plaintiff in Sosa, which
are echoed by arguments again raised in Kiobel, that the ATS is
substantive law creating new grounds for claims. In doing so, the
Court held that the ATS is purely jurisdictional in nature, giving the
district courts ―cognizance‖ of certain causes of action for violations
of international law, rather than providing authority for the creation
of new causes of action, or itself providing a statutory cause of
action.45 In other words, the ATS confers upon the district courts
jurisdiction to adjudicate, and provide a civil remedy for, violations
of a narrow range of customary international law principles that give
rise to individual liability. It does so only through the incorporation
by reference of the law of nations, rather than through any attempt to
implement those principles within domestic law.
This point can be better understood by contrasting the ATS with
the much more recent Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA).46 The
TVPA creates a cause of action for damages in domestic law against
―[a]n individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of
law, of any foreign nation,‖ subjects an individual to torture and
extrajudicial killing, among other things.47 Rather than merely
referring to the definition of torture in the Convention Against
Torture, the TVPA provides its own definition, which is drawn
directly from the convention. In so doing it makes the definition, and
the cause of action, an integral part of U.S. domestic law. The TVPA
is an example of the implementation through statute of certain
international law principles, in contrast to the ATS, which is an
example of the incorporation by reference of certain international
law principles.48 This results in significant differences in how the two
statutes operate, and in whether they should be understood as
constituting an exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction in addition to
authorizing the exercise of adjudicative jurisdiction.
The legislation that implements international law principles will
evolve over time within the domestic legal system, independent of
how those principles may develop in the international system. In
contrast, the incorporation by reference of international law norms,
with the grant of jurisdiction to courts to directly adjudicate the
45. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713.
46. Pub. L. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006)).
47. Id.
48. See Ekaterina Apostolova, The Relationship Between the Alien Tort Statute and the
Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 BERKELEY J. INT‘L L. 640 (2010) (comparing the ATS and
the TVPA).

9-Martin

162

8/28/2013 9:25 PM

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 28:146

violations of those principles, will be much less likely to lead to such
divergence over time.49 When courts are called upon to adjudicate
cases concerning those principles, they will be required to consider
how the principles have evolved and been interpreted within
international law, in a way that they would not be required to do
when the principles are directly implemented through statute. Thus,
the ATS, which the Court in Sosa recognized as merely incorporating
by reference ―the law of nations,‖50 will continue to confer
jurisdiction to adjudicate violations of a class of customary
international law principles, as that class has developed and evolved
over time. In doing so, courts will naturally apply the then-current
interpretations of those international law principles.51
The U.S. federal courts will of course be exercising adjudicative
jurisdiction in cases arising under both the ATS and the TVPA. But
flowing from the difference between the statutes explained above, we
should understand that under the TVPA the courts will be applying
U.S. law to foreign conduct. This application of the law will reflect
an exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction in respect of conduct abroad.
In contrast, in the case of the ATS, the courts will be adjudicating,
and fashioning a civil remedy for, violations of international law
itself. While the remedy is a creation of U.S. law, the substance of the
law being adjudicated and enforced is not—the substantive law
remains the relevant principles of international law.
It will be argued by some that even if this is true, the statutory
fashioning of the remedy, and indeed the rather unique imposition of

49. See Craig Martin, Taking War Seriously: A Model for Constitutional Constraints on
the Use of Force in Compliance with International Law, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 611, 709–11
(2011) (discussing the difference between implementation and incorporation of international
law into domestic law in the context of internalizing norms on the use of force).
50. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 721.
51. On this point I should clarify a position I have taken in the past. In Taking War
Seriously, in the process of discussing the ATS in the context of comparing methods and
ramifications of domestic incorporation and implementation of international law, I wrote that
the ATS did not ―incorporate the international law norms per se, but as the Supreme Court
held in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the statute confers subject matter jurisdiction and creates a
cause of action for the violation of the ‗law of nations,‘ which is a reference to customary
international law.‖ Martin, supra note 49, at 710. Upon reflection, this was too fine a
distinction. By incorporating the ―law of nations‖ by reference, and given that the ―law of
nations‖ has been interpreted to mean a narrow range of customary international law
principles, it is fair to say that the ATS does incorporate by reference that subset of
customary international law principles.
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a civil remedy in tort for violations of international law norms that
are for the most part criminal in nature, is an exercise of prescriptive
jurisdiction—and that this by itself is an impermissible interference
in the sovereignty of other states. There are, however, two responses
to this argument. First, under the concept of universal jurisdiction the
state that has personal jurisdiction over the perpetrator of the crime in
question has some discretion in terms of developing and applying a
sanction.52 Second, this domestic development of a sanction for a
violation of a foreign or international law is entirely consistent with
private international law principles: choice of law and law of the
forum may operate such that the law of one jurisdiction provides for
the prohibition and the basis for liability, while the law of the forum
provides the remedy. In other words, as applied to the circumstances
of the ATS, international law provides for the ―conduct regulating‖
rule, while the law of the forum provides the ―loss-allocating‖ rule.53
III. EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN THE ―GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR‖
The foregoing analysis suggests that there is good reason to
believe that the ATS is not an extraterritorial exercise of prescriptive
jurisdiction, inconsistent with international law principles, even when
applied in foreign-cubed cases. This raises the question of why the
Kiobel Court professed such concern over the possibility, particularly
when that was not the issue presented to the Court. In considering
why the Court might have raised the issue, a natural line of inquiry is
to examine how the Court, and federal courts generally, have dealt
with issues of extraterritoriality in other contexts. Have the courts
been as concerned with the possible extraterritorial application of
other laws? Much has been written on the extraterritorial reach of
U.S. law and how the federal courts have treated such
extraterritoriality.54 The extent to which the United States
52. CRAWFORD, supra note 21, at 467–68.
53. Anthony J. Colangelo, The ATS and Extraterritoriality, Part II: Universal Civil
Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, OPINIO JURIS (Mar. 27, 2012, 10:30 AM),
http://opiniojuris.org/2012/03/27/universal-civil-jurisdiction-and-choice-of-law; see Anthony
J. Colangelo, A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97 VA. L. REV. 1019, 1086 (2011);
see also Hannah Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation, 46 VA. J. INT‘L L. 251, 255,
268, 298 (2006).
54. See Developments in the Law: Extraterritoriality, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1226 (2011);
see also Dan E. Stigall, International Law and Limitations on the Exercise of Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction in U.S. Domestic Law, 35 HASTINGS INT‘L & COMP. L. REV. 323 (2012);
Kenneth W. Dam, Extraterritoriality and Conflicts of Jurisdiction, 77 AM. SOC‘Y INT‘L L.
PROC. 370 (1983); William S. Dodge, The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality After
Morrison, 105 AM. SOC‘Y INT‘L L. PROC. 396 (2011); Michelle K. Fiechter, Extraterritorial
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increasingly sought to apply its antitrust law extraterritorially in the
latter half of the twentieth century, for instance, is notorious.55 But
less studied, and more directly relevant for assessing the Court‘s
stance in Kiobel, is how the courts have treated the extraterritorial
application of U.S. law in cases relating to the so-called ―global war
on terror,‖ in which many of the issues in play, such as arbitrary
detention, interrogation and torture, and extrajudicial killing, are
similar to those that were raised in Kiobel, and are at the center of
many ATS claims. How have the courts considered extraterritoriality
in these cases?
There is a growing and complex jurisprudence relating to the
GWOT, and a similarly robust scholarly analysis of the
jurisprudence.56 This short Article cannot review the entire landscape.
But it examines a few examples, in order to explore the extent to

Application of the Alien Tort Statute: The Effect of Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Ltd.
on Future Litigation, 97 IOWA L. REV. 959 (2012); Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction
Over International Law Claims: Inquiries Into the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT‘L L. &
POL. 1 (1986); Jordan J. Paust, Kiobel, Corporate Liability, and the Extraterritorial Reach of
the ATS, 53 VA. J. INT‘L L. 18 (2012).
55. It was precisely in this area that the courts developed the ―effects doctrine‖ (the
―objective territorial principle‖) to justify the extension of U.S. jurisdiction to govern
conduct abroad that would allegedly impact U.S. markets. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T.
& S.A., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). In doing so, they searched for implicit Congressionial
intent to apply antitrust law abroad to mitigate such effects, all in order to overcome the
presumption against extraterritoriality and the strictures of the Charming Betsy doctrine. The
effects doctrine was explicitly adopted by Congress for application in the realm of antitrust
in the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2006). See generally
Richard W. Beckler & Matthew H. Kirtland, Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust
Law: What is a “Direct, Substantial, and Reasonably Foreseeable Effect” Under the
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act?, 38 TEX. INT‘L L.J. 11 (2003); William S.
Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An Argument for Judicial
Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT‘L L.J. 101 (1998); Joseph P. Griffin, Extraterritoriality in U.S.
and EU Antitrust Enforcement, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 159 (1999); Salil K. Mehra,
Extraterritorial Antitrust Enforcement and the Myth of International Consensus, 10 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT‘L L. 191 (1999); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Review Essay: Extraterritoriality,
Conflict of Laws, and the Regulation of Transnational Business, 25 TEX. INT‘L L.J. 71
(1990).
56. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S.
557 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
See generally Julian G. Ku, The Third Wave: The Alien Tort Statute and the War on
Terrorism, 19 EMORY INT‘L. L. REV. 105 (2005); Jules Lobel, The Supreme Court and Enemy
Combatants, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 1131 (2008); Thomas M. Pohl, From Blackbeard to Bin
Laden: The Re-Emergence of the Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789 and Its Potential Impact on
the Global War on Terrorism, 34 J. LEGIS. 77 (2008).
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which they reveal whether the claims made in those cases were in
response to government conduct that constituted the extraterritorial
exercise of U.S. prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction, potentially
violating international law principles on jurisdiction, and without
explicit congressionial intent—and how the courts have treated such
extraterritorial application of U.S. law.
A.

Extraterritorial Application of Rights – A Misdirected Focus

The majority of cases arising from the GWOT relate to the
detention of foreigners in Guantánamo Bay in Cuba, Bagram Air
Force Base in Afghanistan, and elsewhere. In those cases, and in the
academic literature about this line of cases, there has been extensive
discussion of extraterritoriality—but it relates specifically and
narrowly to the question of whether certain rights under U.S. law
operate extraterritorially and so protect these detainees.57 This focus
overlooks entirely the extraterritorial application of U.S. law that has
given rise to the claims for such rights and protection. Before turning
to that other aspect of these cases, however, it is worth making some
observations about this judicial and scholarly analysis of the
extension of rights. The high-water mark of extraterritorial
application of rights came in Boumediene v. Bush,58 in which the
Court held that the constitutional right to the writ of habeas corpus59
did indeed extend to foreigners being detained in the leased territory
in Guantánamo Bay, and it struck down as unconstitutional the
provisions of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), 60 which
purported to exclude the application of the suspension clause to such
detainees.61 In this sense, Boumediene is viewed as a victory for
rights-protection generally, an expansion of extraterritorial
application of constitutional rights in particular, and a check on the

57. See, e.g., Developments in the Law, supra note 54, at 1126, 1158; Apostolova, supra
note 48; Jamie A. Baron Rodriguez, Torture on Trial: How the Alien Tort Statute May
Expose the United States Government‟s Illegal „Extraordinary Rendition‟ Program Through
Its Use of a Private Contractor, 14 ILSA J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 189 (2007); Ku, supra note 56;
Pohl, supra note 56.
58. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
59. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2.
60. Military Commissions Act of 2006, 109 Pub. L. 366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C. (2006)).
61. For a discussion of the constitutional problems associated with such jurisdiction
stripping, see Alex Glashausser, The Extension Clause and the Supreme Court‟s
Jurisdictional Independence, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1225 (2012); Martin J. Katz, Guantánamo,
Boumediene, and Jurisdiction-Stripping: The Imperial President Meets the Imperial Court,
25 CONST. COMMENT. 377 (2009).
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expanding power of the Executive in the GWOT.62
This holding in Boumediene, however, has been very narrowly
construed by the lower courts in subsequent cases, and the Court has
chosen not to grant certiorari in any of these cases. For example, the
D.C. Circuit purported to apply the Boumediene standard in Al
Maqaleh v. Gates,63 holding that the writ of habeas corpus did not
extend to persons detained at Bagram.64 The primary distinguishing
features, according to the court, were that the United States did not
exercise the kind of de facto sovereign control over Bagram that it
did over Guantánamo Bay65 (a feature that had been emphasized by
Justice Kennedy in Boumediene66), and that Bagram was located in a
theatre of war, thus creating practical obstacles to extending
constitutional rights to detainees there.67 So, notwithstanding
Boumediene, the extraterritorial application of rights under U.S. law,
including constitutional rights, to those who are arguably under the
complete jurisdiction and control of the U.S. government, has
actually been very limited.68

62. For analysis of Boumediene, see, e.g., Ryan Firestone, The Boumediene Illusion: The
Unsettled Role of Habeas Corpus Abroad in the War on Terror, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 555
(2012); Jonathan Hafetz, Calling the Government to Account: Habeas Corpus in the
Aftermath of Boumediene, 57 WAYNE L. REV. 99 (2011); Walter E. Kuhn, The Terrorist
Detention Review Reform Act: Detention Policy and Political Reality, 35 SETON HALL LEGIS.
J. 221 (2011); Lobel, supra note 56; Nathaniel H. Nesbitt, Meeting Boumediene‟s Challenge:
The Emergence of an Effective Habeas Jurisprudence and Obsolescence of New Detention
Legislation, 95 MINN. L. REV. 244 (2010).
63. 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
64. Id. at 98.
65. Id. at 97.
66. 553 U.S. 723, 755 (2008).
67. Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 97.
68. See, e.g., JENNIFER K. ELSEA & MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R41156, JUDICIAL ACTIVITY CONCERNING ENEMY COMBATANT DETAINEES: MAJOR COURT
RULINGS (2012) (reviewing detention cases); see also N.Y. STATE BAR ASS‘N COMM. ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT ON EXECUTIVE DETENTION, HABEAS CORPUS AND THE MILITARY
COMMISSIONS ACT OF 2006 (2008); Lobel, supra note 56; Joshua Geltzer, Decisions
Detained: The Courts‟ Embrace of Complexity in Guantánamo-Related Litigation, 29
BERKLEY J. INT‘L L. 94 (2011); Alexandra Link, Trying Terrorism: Joint Criminal
Enterprise, Material Support, and the Paradox of International Criminal Law, 34 MICH. J.
INT‘L L. 439 (2013). Parenthetically, this very limited extension of rights to persons under
U.S. control can be contrasted with how the European Court of Human Rights has analyzed
the extension of rights under the European Convention of Human Rights to detainees and
others killed by the armed forces of member states. See, e.g., Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom,
App. No. 55721/07, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 589 (2011).
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The focus in U.S. legal discourse on the extent and validity of
the extraterritorial application of rights in the context of the GWOT
may highlight the significant limits placed on the protections
available to detainees and others subject to U.S. jurisdiction. But it
tends to obscure the extent to which U.S. law is being applied
extraterritorially in a manner that violates the principles of
international law on jurisdiction. Indeed, the exclusive focus on the
extension of rights in the context of discussing extraterritoriality may
be viewed as being somewhat bizarre, particularly in light of the
arguments made in Kiobel, for two reasons. First, the extension of
constitutional rights for the purpose of providing protections to
foreigners located in the territory of another state, in their relationship
with the government of the United States, is not the kind of
extraterritorial application of law that is likely to offend the
sovereignty of that other state.69 It is not an exercise of jurisdiction in
which U.S. law prescribes, limits, or otherwise governs the conduct
of a foreign national in foreign territory. Rather, it only provides
protections to a foreigner in his or her interaction with the U.S.
government, in a manner that tends to be of little relevance to the
laws of the territory in which the person happens to be located.70
Second, and more important, this preoccupation with whether
U.S. legal rights can apply extraterritorially to protect foreign
plaintiffs entirely fails to question whether the government conduct
against which those plaintiffs seek protection is itself an
impermissible extraterritorial application of U.S. law. The judicial
and academic focus on rights, while ignoring the government‘s
actions giving rise to those rights claims, seems almost paradoxical.
Because upon some reflection, it would appear that the laws and
policies that are the cause of the rights claims in these GWOT cases
constitute a much more problematic exercise of either prescriptive or
enforcement jurisdiction within the territory of another state than any
extension of rights would be, and they are arguably in violation of the
international law principles on jurisdiction.71 It is to that
69. See generally Zachary D. Clopton, Replacing the Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality, B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013); Chimène I. Keitner, Rights Beyond
Borders, 36 YALE J. INT‘L L. 55 (2011); Stigall, supra note 54.
70. However, courts have argued that extending rights could interfere with the foreign
relations of the United States with the government of Afghanistan. See, e.g., Al-Zahrani v.
Rumsfeld, 684 F. Supp. 2d 103, 112 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
71. As explained, the primary argument is that these laws do constitute an exercise of
jurisdiction, arguably in violation of international law principles and the domestic
presumptions. The first implication of this is that U.S. jurisdiction should not be so applied.
But alternatively, these observations should also bolster the argument that the Constitution
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extraterritorial application of U.S. law that I now turn.
B.

Indefinite Detention

To explore this second point in more detail, I begin by
considering the circumstances surrounding the early detention cases.
It will be recalled that from the beginning of 2002, shortly after the
invasion of Afghanistan, the United States began transporting
suspected members of al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other persons
suspected of being or supporting terrorists, to a detention facility at
Guantánamo Bay. Rising to over 700 persons, these detainees were
specifically not afforded the status of prisoners of war under the
Geneva Conventions, nor were they charged with any criminal
offense.72 The detainees were said to be detained pursuant to the
authority of the AUMF,73 which was a joint resolution of Congress
authorizing the President to:
[U]se all necessary and appropriate force against those
nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to
prevent any future acts of international terrorism
against the United States by such nations,
organizations or persons.74
In addition, authority flowed from the Presidential Military Order of
November 13, 2001, titled ―Detention, Treatment, and Trial of
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism‖ (Presidential
MO).75
The majority of the detainees in Guantánamo had been captured
ought to follow the flag. Those who will defend the legitimacy of these extraterritorial
applications of U.S. law should have a difficult time also maintaining, on a principled basis,
that rights should not also be extended to those affected by such laws.
72. Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,831, 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001);
see also COMM. ON MILITARY AFFAIRS & JUSTICE OF THE ASS‘N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF
NEW YORK, INTER ARMA SILENT LEGES: IN TIMES OF ARMED CONFLICT, SHOULD THE LAWS BE
SILENT? (2001), available at http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/should_the_laws.pdf.
73. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)).
74. Id. § 2(a).
75. See supra note 72.
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in Afghanistan, which was a theater of war in the international armed
conflict in which the United States was a belligerent (the international
armed conflict became a non-international armed conflict in 2002,
but the United States remained a belligerent assisting the government
against an insurgency). Many, however, had been detained in other
countries in which there was no armed conflict. They were,
moreover, nationals of countries not involved in the conflict in
Afghanistan. Many of them also argued that they had no affiliation
with either al-Qaeda or the Taliban. A plurality of the Supreme Court
had held in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,76 the first in the line of Supreme
Court detention cases, that the government‘s authority to detain
persons captured fighting in Afghanistan was a necessary incident to
the authority conferred by the AUMF,77 but that left open the
question of whether the AUMF could provide authority to detain
those persons captured elsewhere.
Several of these detainees challenged in the federal courts the
validity of their detention, and some of them grounded their claims in
part under the ATS itself. The issue reached the Supreme Court in the
amalgamated case of Rasul v. Bush,78 the second in the line of
detention cases decided by the Supreme Court, handed down in 2004.
The petitioners were Australian and Kuwaiti nationals.79 One of the
Australians, Mamdouh Habib, was a dual Egyptian and Australian
national, who had been captured in Pakistan, was held and
interrogated there by the CIA, and then ―rendered‖ to Egypt, where
he was again interrogated and allegedly tortured for five months,
after which he was transferred to Guantánamo.80
The primary issue before the Court in Rasul was whether federal
76. 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (―We conclude that detention of individuals falling into the
limited category we are considering, for the duration of the particular conflict in which they
were captured, is so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be an exercise of the
‗necessary and appropriate force‘ Congress has authorized the President to use.‖).
77. Id. at 517. Hamdi was also a U.S. citizen, and much of the case turned on the
question of the authority to detain an American determined to be an ―enemy combatant.‖ Id.
at 509.
78. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
79. Id. at 470.
80. For a compilation of court documents relating to Habib‘s litigation, see Declaration
of Teresa A. McPalmer, Habib v. Bush, No. 02-CV-1130 (D.D.C. Oct. 1, 2004), available at
http://humanrights.ucdavis.edu/projects/the-guantanamo-testimonials-project/testimonies/test
imonies-of-the-defense-department/csrts/csrt_isn_661.pdf. For accounts of his ordeal, see
Profile: Hamdouh Habib, BBCNEWS (Dec. 7, 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asiapacific/4214747.stm; JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WAR ON
TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS 125–26 (2008).
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courts had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to hear the habeas
corpus claims of such detainees.81 Or, to put it another way, whether
the statutory right to habeas corpus had extraterritorial application to
persons detained at Guantánamo Bay. The government argued that
the statutory right to habeas corpus could not be extended to
Guantánamo precisely because it would constitute an impermissible
extraterritorial application of law, in violation of the presumption
against extraterritoriality in U.S. law.82 The majority held that the
presumption could not apply to the operation of the habeas statute
with respect to persons detained in Guantánamo, because of the
extent to which the United States exercised jurisdiction over
Guantánamo Bay and the government agents implementing the
detention.83 Thus, in essence, the application of the statute at
Guantánamo would not be extraterritorial at all. Having found that
the federal courts had jurisdiction for that purpose, the majority
proceeded to find that the courts also had jurisdiction to hear ATS
claims, which the lower courts had denied on the grounds that the
detainees lacked ―litigation privilege‖ in the United States.84
This account of the case thus far is typical of the discussion
regarding the extent to which habeas corpus and constitutional rights
should be applied extraterritorially. In that sense it was a victory for
the detainees. But let us pause to consider the extraterritorial
operation of U.S. law that deprived these applicants of their freedom.
Individuals who were citizens of countries on friendly terms with the
United States were seized and detained in countries that were not
engaged in any armed conflict and in which the United States was
certainly not a belligerent, on the direction of U.S. agents. The
captured individuals were then subjected to interrogation by agents of
the U.S. government (and other governments, in cooperation with
U.S. agents) and indefinitely detained without charge by the U.S.
government.85 Leaving aside the extent to which these actions were
81. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475.
82. Id. at 480.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 484.
85. It should be noted that one of the petitioners in Rasul was David Hicks, the
Australian who was ultimately charged and later convicted under a plea agreement for
providing material support to terrorists in the Military Commissions in Guantánamo. He
remains one of only a handful of persons charged and convicted under the military
commissions system. Mamdouh Habib was released in 2005.
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violations of U.S. obligations under international law in other
respects (namely, under international human rights law and the
international law of diplomatic relations), they were arguably
extraterritorial applications of U.S. law in apparent violation of the
principles of jurisdiction under international law.86
The seizure, interrogation, and detention constituted an exercise
of U.S. jurisdiction that began in foreign territory and in respect of
foreign nationals, for alleged conduct that had occurred in foreign
territory. The Supreme Court in Rasul partially grounded its decision
regarding jurisdiction on the fact that the detainees were currently in
a territory that was effectively under U.S. jurisdiction, and on the
basis that the U.S. agents implementing such detention were certainly
under the jurisdiction of the federal courts.87 That was so for purposes
of the operation of the habeas statute and the ATS. But left
unexamined is the fact that the circumstances leading to the detention
of these foreigners reflected an extraterritorial application of U.S. law
and that the continued detention of foreigners for alleged conduct in
third countries constituted an ongoing extraterritorial exercise of
jurisdiction. These actions were not only the exercise of prescriptive
jurisdiction, but, more importantly, of enforcement jurisdiction.
Enforcement jurisdiction is treated with the most suspicion under
international law because it is most likely to offend the sovereignty of
other states when exercised extraterritorially.88
I discuss below whether such exercise of jurisdiction may be
justified under one of the exceptions to the international law
prohibitions against extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction, and
whether these detentions were undertaken pursuant to explicit and
intentional congressionial direction so as to defeat the domestic
presumptions. But I will argue that it cannot be so justified, and if
that is right, then this was a violation of both the international law
principles and the domestic presumptions that the Court was so
concerned about in Kiobel. While I will examine these issues in more
detail below, I pause here to consider some aspects relating to the
apparent legal authority for these detentions, which should be a
fundamental line of inquiry in any habeas litigation. As noted above,
the Supreme Court held in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld89 that the government
86. Whether such conduct falls within the scope of the exceptions discussed earlier, will
be addressed in Part IV.B.
87. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 478–79.
88. CRAWFORD, supra note 21, at 478–82.
89. 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality opinion).
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is authorized under the AUMF to detain persons captured while
fighting U.S. forces in Afghanistan.90 But a significant number of
detainees being held in Guantánamo and elsewhere were not captured
in Afghanistan, are not members of al-Qaeda, and so do not readily
fit within the scope of the AUMF. Thus, the legal authority for their
detention is not clear, which should trigger questions of
extraterritoriality under the domestic presumptions.
Consider the case of Al Maqaleh v. Gates,91 in which habeas
claims were brought by three individuals who were being detained at
Bagram.92 One was a Yemeni citizen who was originally captured in
Thailand, another was a Tunisian who was captured in Pakistan, and
the third was a Yemeni citizen whose place of capture was disputed.93
All three were citizens of countries with which the United States was
not in armed conflict, and two alleged that they were captured in
countries that were not theaters of armed conflict.94 Their detention in
Afghanistan had no relation to the armed conflict in Afghanistan,95
and they were initially detained at sites in other countries, the
location of which has not been disclosed.96 It is not clear, nor did the
D.C. Circuit engage in any detailed analysis to clarify, how these
individuals came within the scope of the language of the AUMF,
which only authorized the use of force against those organizations or
persons who had been responsible for the 9/11 attacks and those who
had harbored such persons after the fact.97
Moreover, the process by which the detainees were determined
to come within the scope of the detention power was itself highly
suspect. Their status as ―enemy combatants‖ was established in a
process conducted before an ―Unlawful Enemy Combatant Review
Board‖ (UECRB).98 The district court and D.C. Circuit both held that
the UECRB afforded detainees with even fewer procedural rights
90. Id. at 518.
91. 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
92. Id. at 88.
93. Id. at 87.
94. Joint Brief for Petitioners-Appellees at 2–3, Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d 84 (Nos. 09-5265,
09-5266, 09-5277).
95. Id. at 1–2.
96. Id. at 2–3.
97. Authorization for Use of Military Force, § 2, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)).
98. Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 96.
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than the Combat Status Review Tribunals (CSRT) that were
established after the decision in Rasul v. Bush.99 Consequently,
because of the irregularity of the process by which status was
determined, the D.C. Circuit held that ―while the important adequacy
of process factor [in the Boumediene test] strongly supported the
extension of the Suspension Clause and habeas rights in Boumediene,
it even more strongly favors petitioners here.‖100 Nonetheless, the
court denied the petition for habeas corpus on the grounds that the
United States did not exercise de facto sovereignty over Bagram, and
it was, in any event, in a theater of war.101
What is significant, however, is the absence of any apparent
inquiry into the justification for the extraterritorial exercise of U.S.
jurisdiction. The determination of the detainees‘ status as ―unlawful
enemy combatants‖ was through the application of a U.S. legal
framework within the territory of Afghanistan. The UECRB was not
established pursuant to any federal legislation, and indeed the precise
policy and procedure of the UECRB was extremely unclear at the
time.102 Whether these individuals could be legitimately detained
under the putative authority of the AUMF, therefore, remains a
highly debatable point.
Nonetheless, the detention constituted an exercise of prescriptive
jurisdiction, and one much more likely to conflict with the laws and
sovereign rights of Afghanistan than any extension of U.S. legal
rights could. Indeed, significant friction between the United States
and Afghanistan over U.S. detentions at Bagram and elsewhere has
continued up to the time of this writing.103 What is more, the resulting
detention of these individuals within Afghanistan reflects not only an
exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction, but also enforcement jurisdiction
within the territory of another sovereign state, against which the
international law principles on jurisdiction are the most restrictive. As
99. 542 U.S. 466 (2008).
100. Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 96.
101. Id. at 97.
102. See Memorandum from Deputy Sec‘y of Def. for Sec‘ys of the Military Dep‘ts,
Policy Guidance on Review Procedures and Transfer and Release Auth. at Bagram Theater
Internment Facility, Afg. (July 2, 2009), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs
/natsec/bagram20100514/07bagrampolicy_30-92.pdf; Reply to Petitioner‘s Opposition to
Respondents‘ Motion to Dismiss, Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d 84 (Nos. 09-5265, 09-5266, 095267).
103. See, e.g., Rod Nordland, Karzai Orders Afghan Forces to Take Control of AmericanBuilt Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2013, at A4; Rod Nordland, U.S. Cancels Transfer of
Bagram Prison to Afghans, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/
03/09/world/asia/us-cancels-transfer-of-bagram-prison-to-afghans.html?r=0.
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will be discussed below, this exercise of jurisdiction arguably did not
fall within the exceptions on the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction,
nor was it a direct application of the law of armed conflict.104 There is
no exploration in the court‘s judgment of whether this exercise of
jurisdiction met the international law exceptions, no inquiry into the
precise legal authority for it, and whether such authority reflected
explicit congressionial intent to violate international law. Yet, while
preoccupied with the question of whether the rights of habeas corpus
could extend extraterritorially to apply to detainees in Bagram, the
D.C. Circuit never even considered the question of whether the
application of U.S. law in detaining those individuals in Bagram was
itself a permissible extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction. The courts
are untroubled by the question: if habeas rights cannot be extended,
how can the laws that are depriving the habeas applicant of his liberty
be so extended? And if the extraterritorial application of law
depriving him of his liberty is legitimate, how can it be that the
related habeas rights do not equally so apply?
C. Torture and U.S. Defendants
In addition to the burgeoning number of detention and habeas
claims arising from the GWOT, there are a disturbing number of
cases that involve allegations of torture conducted by agents of the
U.S. government, or in some cases by foreign agents at the behest of
the U.S. government. Several of these cases included claims
advanced under the ATS. The manner in which the courts have dealt
with these cases is relevant to my discussion here for a number of
reasons.
First, torture was one of the claims advanced in Kiobel,105 and
there can be no question that the prohibition against torture is,
pursuant to the Sosa standard, one of the jus cogens norms that falls
within the narrow range of principles that can ground an ATS claim.
The claim in Filártiga, it will be recalled, was based on a violation of
the prohibition against torture.106 Like piracy, torture is one of those
international wrongs over which all countries have jurisdiction to
adjudicate and provide remedies. Indeed, the Convention Against
Torture not only authorizes the exercise of universal jurisdiction, but
104. See infra Part IV.B.
105. 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1663 (2013).
106. Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 877 (2d Cir. 1980).
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it imposes obligations on states to prosecute or extradite those
accused of torture. 107
Second, it is particularly instructive to examine how the courts
have considered torture claims advanced under the ATS where the
defendants are U.S. nationals. One of the arguments against ATS
claims in foreign-cubed cases is that they are impermissible precisely
because there is no essential connection to the United States.108 Such
arguments suggest that while it might make sense for U.S. courts to
adjudicate the claims of foreigners when the defendant is a U.S.
national, or there is some other substantial connection to the United
States, it is not reasonable for them to do so when both parties are
foreigners and the offending conduct occurred abroad.109 These
arguments make frequent reference to the original incidents that are
said to have motivated the enactment of the ATS, such as attacks on
foreign ambassadors within the territory of the United States. The
clear implication is that ATS claims by foreigners against U.S.
defendants, for the violation of jus cogens norms (or other principles
of customary international law falling within the Sosa standard),
would be valid (subject to other defenses) and indeed fulfill the
original intent of the statute.
The reality reflected by the torture cases arising from the
GWOT, however, suggests that such arguments are hollow. While
they are raised against the adjudication of foreign-cubed ATS cases,
they are nowhere to be found when a U.S. defendant is actually
before a court. For instance, in Rasul v. Myers,110 the D.C. Circuit
considered the claims of four British detainees against then Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and others for having unlawfully
detained the petitioners at Guantánamo Bay, and for the torture that

107. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment arts. 4–8, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
108. This was, indeed, one of the central arguments of Justice Breyer in his concurrence in
Kiobel. See 133 S. Ct. at 1677–78 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
109. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Reargument, supra note 9, at 45 (oral argument of
Solicitor General Donald Verrilli); Brief of the Governments of the Kingdom of the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amici Curiae
in Support of Neither Party, supra note 39, at 15.
110. 512 F.3d 644 (D.C. Cir. 2008), vacated, 555 U.S. 1083 (2008). The case, often
referred to as Rasul I, is complicated by the fact that the decision was vacated and remanded
by the Supreme Court on the basis that the decision in Boumediene cast aspects of it in
doubt. But in Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1091
(2009), often referred to as Rasul II, the D.C. Circuit reinstated its decision in Rasul I, and
the Supreme Court denied the application for certiorari. So ultimately, the decision in Rasul I
on the ATS stands, and the Supreme Court denied certriorari on that issue.
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they alleged they had suffered while detained. They advanced these
claims on a number of grounds, including the Fifth and Eighth
Amendments of the Constitution, the ATS, and certain provisions of
the Geneva Conventions.111
The D.C. Circuit dismissed the claims in part based on
arguments that the constitutional rights in question did not extend
extraterritorially to detainees in Guantánamo Bay—once again
focusing on the limited reach of the Constitution.112 But the court also
dismissed the ATS claims of the petitioners, holding that the
―detention and interrogation of suspected enemy combatants‖ by the
defendants was ―incidental to [their] legitimate employment
duties.‖113 Therefore, because the defendants ―had acted within the
scope of their employment‖ the ATS claims were ―restyled‖ as
claims against the United States governed by the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA),114 and the court then dismissed those claims for failure
to exhaust administrative remedies as the FTCA requires.115 The
FTCA allows suits against the government for personal injury or
death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of an
employee of the government while acting in the scope of his office or
employment.116 It also, however, bars such claims where the wrong
occurred in a foreign country.117 Moreover, the FTCA was amended
by the Westfall Act,118 such that where the government employee
was acting within the scope of his office or employment, the suit can
only be brought against the government, and not against any
individual.119 The Supreme Court denied certiorari in respect to these
ATS claims in Rasul v. Myers,120 apparently seeing no reason to
disturb this rejection of ATS claims against U.S. defendants for
torture.
Two years later, in Ali v. Rumsfeld,121 the D.C. Circuit
111. Rasul I, 512 F.3d at 649.
112. Id. at 664–65 .
113. Id. at 658–59.
114. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2006).
115. Rasul I, 512 F.3d at 660–61.
116. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).
117. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2006).
118. 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (2006).
119. Id. § 2679(b)(1).
120. 555 U.S. 1083 (2008). For details of the case history, see supra note 110.
121. 649 F.3d 762 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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considered the claims of a number of individuals who had been
detained in Afghanistan and Iraq. The plaintiffs alleged, among other
things, that they had suffered abuse that would qualify as torture and
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, in violation of international
law.122 The claims were made against government agents, again
including former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. Relying on its
holding in Rasul v. Myers, the court again found that the defendants
had been acting within the scope of their employment in engaging in
the alleged torture123—and again found that the Westfall Act applied,
such that the claims had to be properly brought against the United
States rather than the individual defendants.124 As such,
administrative remedies had to have been exhausted, and as they
were not, the claims were dismissed.125 Interestingly, the Westfall
Act does not immunize federal employees in circumstances in which
the tort involves the violation of a federal statute, and in Ali v.
Rumsfeld petitioners argued that the defendants had violated the ATS
itself, and thus could not come within the scope of the Westfall Act.
The court, in rejecting this argument, reaffirmed its understanding of
Sosa, in that the ATS was a strictly jurisdictional statute, and that it
created no substantive cause of action. The violations of law that the
petitioners alleged constituted violations of customary international
law, which the ATS empowered the federal courts to adjudicate, but
did not constitute violations of the ATS itself.126
There are, of course, a number of other cases involving claims
for remedies to address injury caused by torture perpetrated either by
agents of the U.S. government, or those of other states acting in
cooperation with the U.S. government. And there is also now a
significant degree of evidence that the U.S. government under the
Bush administration engaged in systematic torture, approved at the
122. Id. at 765.
123. The torture claims were, of course, assumed to be true for the purposes of the motion.
Id. at 769.
124. Id. at 775.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 775–76. The D.C. Circuit‘s interpretation of Sosa, and of the ATS as a purely
jurisdictional grant to adjudicate violations of international law, was of course consistent
with the position that I have taken here on the operation of the ATS. But it is not at all clear
that such an interpretation necessitates the holding that the ATS cannot thereby be violated
within the meaning of the immunity exception in the Westfall Act. Judge Edwards, in a
powerful dissent in Ali, argued that where a court determines for the purposes of an ATS
claim that a state official has engaged in torture, in violation of a principle of international
law that falls within the Sosa standard, such a violation constitutes a violation of the ATS for
the purposes of triggering the exception in the Westfall Act. Id. at 778–93 (Edwards, J.,
dissenting).
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highest levels of government.127 In Al-Zahrani v. Rodriguez,128 the
families of detainees who were alleged to have died as a result of
torture in Guantánamo Bay brought claims against a number of
individual defendants, including the Director of the Joint Intelligence
Group, under the ATS and other grounds.129 On appeal, the D.C.
Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claims, holding that the court
lacked jurisdiction to consider the issues because of the jurisdiction
stripping provisions of the Military Commissions Act of 2006
(MCA).130 Yet while it was quite true that the Military Commissions
Act had stripped jurisdiction to consider claims of ―an alien who is or
was detained by the United States and has been determined by the
United States to have been properly detained as an enemy
combatant,‖131 there was no apparent inquiry into whether these
deceased claimants had been ―determined by the United States to
have been properly detained as an enemy combatant.‖ It has been
well known for some time that many of the detainees held in
Guantánamo Bay were not ―enemy combatants‖ as defined by the
United States, and that the determination process that resulted in
many being classified as ―enemy combatants‖ was deeply flawed.132
Stepping back again to consider the underlying circumstances of
these cases, there is at once an unmistakable asymmetry in how the
court thinks about extraterritoriality, as well as a continued pattern of
the rights claims being denied on technical doctrinal grounds.
Moreover, the narrow technical reasoning in the denial of these
claims stands in marked contrast to the broad and sweeping fashion
in which the court establishes or accepts U.S. authority to detain and
127. THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, REPORT OF THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT‘S TASK FORCE
DETAINEE TREATMENT 3–7 (2013), available at http://detaineetaskforce.org/pdf/FullReport.pdf.
128. 669 F.3d 315 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
129. Id. at 316–17.
130. Id. at 317; 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2) (2006) (―Except as provided in [§§ 1005(e)(2) and
(e)(3) of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005], no court, justice, or judge shall have
jurisdiction to hear or consider any other action against the United States or its agents
relating to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of confinement
of an alien who is or was detained by the United States and has been determined by the
United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such
determination.‖).
131. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2).
132. See, e.g., Mark Denbeaux & Joshua W. Denbeaux, No-Hearing Hearings: CSRT:
The Modern Habeas Corpus? (Seton Hall Law Pub. Law & Legal Research Paper Series,
2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=951245.
ON
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otherwise exercise jurisdiction over claimants. Thus, the D.C. Circuit
in both decisions in Rasul v. Myers rejected the argument that
substantive constitutional rights other than the narrow right to habeas
corpus could be extended extraterritorially to benefit the detainees in
Guantánamo Bay.133 The court held that Guantánamo Bay was
foreign territory over which the United States did not have
sovereignty for constitutional purposes.134 At the same time, it did not
seem to consider at all the question of whether the conduct of the
defendants, in detaining and interrogating these foreign individuals at
Guantánamo Bay, was an extraterritorial exercise of prescriptive and
enforcement jurisdiction in violation of the principles of jurisdiction
in international law.
Quite apart from the authority to detain, considered above, what
was the authority of the agents to interrogate and indeed to torture
these claimants? For the purpose of triggering the application of the
Westfall Act and the FTCA, the court was prepared to assume that
the American defendants were acting in the normal course of their
duties as agents of the U.S. government, but did not consider whether
their conduct was actually authorized by statute, and whether such
legislation provided clear congressionial intent to apply
extraterritorially, or indeed whether it conferred authority to detain
and interrogate individuals of a class that included these specific
claimants. As discussed above, the process by which detainees were
determined to fall within the scope of the supposedly authorizing
legislation—namely the CSRT and UECRB procedures—was itself
only an administrative policy, and it was deeply flawed.135
Then there are the contrasting ways in which the courts have
considered the issue of ―nexus.‖ The concept of nexus has been
important on the one hand to establish legal authority to detain
persons captured beyond the battlefields of Afghanistan or Iraq, but
on the other hand to deny the legal claims of such detainees.
Beginning with the authority to detain, in a series of cases the D.C.
Circuit has held that persons may be detained even if the nexus to alQaeda or associated forces is highly attenuated, or even replaced by
other criteria altogether.136 Such nexus may be established through a
133. Rasul v. Myers (Rasul I), 512 F.3d 644, 666 (D.C. Cir. 2008), vacated, 555 U.S.
1083 (2008); Rasul v. Myers (Rasul II), 563 F.3d 527, 531 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
134. Rasul I, 512 F.3d at 666–67; Rasul II, 563 F.3d at 531.
135. Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 132, at 2–3, 38–39; see also supra text
accompanying notes 99–100.
136. See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010), petition for reh‟g en banc
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―functional approach,‖ rather than requiring any evidence of actual
membership or other formal connection.137 The evidentiary burden
for establishing such nexus is merely a ―preponderance of the
evidence‖ standard.138 Perhaps most astonishing, the government
records used to establish such a nexus, including mere summaries of
intelligence reports, are entitled to a ―presumption of regularity‖ and
thus can be relied upon as such by the courts.139
In Al-Bihani v. Obama, the court held that the AUMF provided
authority for the detention of persons who ―purposefully and
materially support such forces in hostilities against U.S. coalition
partners.‖140 It did so by relying not only on the AUMF, but the
definition of who could be tried by military commission in the
MCA—a statute that, of course, did not itself provide any authority to
detain anyone.141 It went on to specifically reject the relevance of the
international law of armed conflict in any such determination.142 This
was later affirmed in Almerfedi v. Obama,143 in which the court held
that the government may detain ―any individual engaged in hostilities
. . . against the United States, who purposefully and materially
supported hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners,
or who is part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces.‖144 This
interpretation of the AUMF, as authorizing detention separate and
apart from any necessary nexus to ―al Qaeda and associated forces,‖
and entirely unrelated to the 9/11 attacks, vastly broadens the scope
of who can be detained and is not supported by the text of the
legislation. It is, moreover, inconsistent with the Supreme Court‘s
holding in Hamdi,145 yet the Supreme Court refused to grant
denied, 619 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011); see also Almerfedi
v. Obama, 654 F.3d 1, 4 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2739 (2012).
137. See Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1814
(2011); Salahi v. Obama, 625 F.3d 745 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
138. Al Odah v. United States, 611 F.3d 8 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert denied, 131 S. Ct. 1812
(2011).
139. Latif v. Obama, 666 F.3d 746 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert denied, 132 S. Ct. 2741 (2012).
For a review of all these cases, see ELSEA & GARCIA, supra note 68.
140. Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 872.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 871.
143. Almerfedi, 654 F.3d at 4 n.2.
144. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
145. Cf. ELSEA & GARCIA, supra note 68, at 8–9; Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Replies
to Congressionial Authorization: International Law, U.S. War Powers, and the Global War
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certiorari in Al-Bihani.146
In contrast to this, as discussed above, courts strictly construed
nexus requirements for the purpose of denying liability in rights
claims. One of the key issues raised by the Court in Kiobel itself was
whether there was sufficient nexus between the defendant
corporations and the United States.147 The majority held that there
was not, writing that, ―[c]orporations are often present in many
countries, and it would reach too far to say that mere corporate
presence suffices.‖148
The decision in Arar v. Ashcroft,149 a case involving (among
other things) a claim brought under the TVPA, similarly reflected a
strict interpretation of nexus requirements. The notorious Arar case
arose from the detention of Maher Arar, a Canadian-Syrian dual
national while in transit through New York, and his rendition to
Syria, where he was interrogated and tortured over the course of a
year in detention.150 The Second Circuit held that in order to ground a
claim against U.S. defendants under the TVPA for torture committed
by Syrian agents allegedly at the bidding of and in cooperation with
the U.S. defendants, the statute required that the U.S. defendants had
acted ―under color of foreign law, or under its authority.‖151 The
court construed this very strictly and literally in denying the claim,
holding that while the defendants may have ―encouraged or solicited
certain conduct by foreign officials . . . . Such conduct is insufficient
to establish that the defendants were in some way clothed with the
authority of Syrian law or that their conduct may be otherwise

on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2653 (2005) (discussing the relevance of the law of armed
conflict to the interpretation of the AUMF). It should be noted that in a denial of a petition
for an en banc rehearing of the Al-Bihani case, a concurring opinion by the majority of the
court suggested that the part of the decision on the relevance of the law of armed conflict to
the AUMF was non-binding obiter dicta. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(Sentelle, C.J., concurring).
146. 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011) (mem.).
147. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013); id. at 1677–78
(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
148. Id. at 1669 (majority opinion).
149. 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009).
150. See COMM‘N OF INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF CANADIAN OFFICIALS IN RELATION TO
MAHER ARAR, REPORT OF THE EVENTS RELATING TO MAHER ARAR: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (2006), available at http://www.pch.gc.ca/cs-kc/arar/Arar_e.pdf
(detailing a full account of the circumstances of Arar‘s detention and torture); see also DEP‘T
OF HOMELAND SEC. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., THE REMOVAL OF A CANADIAN CITIZEN TO
SYRIA (2008), available at http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_08-18_Mar08.pdf.
151. Arar, 585 F.3d at 568.
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attributable to Syria.‖152 Writing in dissent, Judge Pooler, joined by
Judges Calabresi, Sack, and Parker, noted that this interpretation of
the nexus requirement for purposes of the TVPA was strained and
inconsistent with other jurisprudence employing a ―color of law‖
test.153 She argued that when looked at through the prism of agency
law, the distinction drawn by the majority, between facilitating and
directing torture and actually engaging in the acts of torture was
unprincipled, adding that ―[i]f we carry the majority‘s logic to its
extreme, federal agents could never be responsible for torture
inflicted under color of foreign law, even if they were in the room
with the foreign torturers orchestrating the techniques.‖154
Similarly, as discussed above, the court in Ali v. Rumsfeld
employed a very strict interpretation of the relevant statutes, holding
that proof of torture as part of an ATS claim, while clearly a violation
of the relevant international law prohibitions, could not constitute a
violation of the ATS itself for purposes of the sovereign immunity
exception in the Westfall Act and the FTCA.155 In dissent, Judge
Edwards argued that this interpretation was incorrect for a number of
reasons, and he concluded, ―It is ironic that, under the majority‘s
approach, United States officials who torture a foreign national in a
foreign country are not subject to suit in an action brought under [the
ATS], whereas foreign officials who commit official torture in a
foreign country may be sued under [the ATS].‖156 Of course, the
current reality is that virtually no one can be sued for torture under
the ATS, whether a U.S. or foreign citizen, no matter where the
torture takes place. The suggestion that a sufficient U.S. connection
will ground ATS claims is just a chimera. Moreover, the United
States has detained, interrogated, and has indeed tortured people, on
the basis of a nexus to terrorist organizations that is very loosely
defined, established on weak evidence through a flawed process, on
the basis of legal authority that is very broadly interpreted. At the
same time, we deny the claims, rights, and remedies of the same
people due to strictly defined nexus requirements and narrowly
construed interpretations of governing statutes.

152. Id.
153. Id. at 629 (Pooler, J., dissenting).
154. Id.
155. Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 755–76 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
156. Id. at 779 (Edwards, J., dissenting).
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D. Extrajudicial Killing
The final issue I will explore is extrajudicial killing. It was one
of the specific issues raised in the ATS claims of the plaintiffs in
Kiobel. It was also an issue brought before the federal courts in the
case of Al-Aulaqi v. Obama.157 The case involved the now-famous
Anwar Al-Aulaqi,158 the dual U.S.-Yemeni national who was a
propagandist for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) until he
was killed along with another dual-U.S. citizen and several other
people in a CIA drone strike in Yemen on September 30, 2011.159
The lawsuit was commenced after it was reported in early 2010 that
Al-Aulaqi had been placed on a kill-list authorizing his targeting in
the U.S. drone-based targeted killing program.160 His father, Nasser,
brought an application in federal court, on behalf of both his son and
himself, for an injunction to prevent the government from killing AlAulaqi.161 Of interest for the purposes of this Article, one of the
claims was brought under the ATS, based on the argument that the
killing of Al-Aulaqi outside of the context of armed conflict, and
outside of circumstances in which he posed a concrete, specific and
imminent threat to life or physical safety, would constitute an
extrajudicial killing in violation of both treaty and customary
international law principles.162
The claim of Al-Aulaqi‘s father was dismissed on several
grounds, including standing and the application of the political
question doctrine.163 But among the grounds for dismissing the claim,
Judge Bates of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
held that there was no cognizable claim under the ATS, and that in
any event the United States had not waived sovereign immunity with
respect to any claim under the ATS.164 It is this aspect of the decision
that will be examined here. Significantly, the court began by

157. 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010).
158. His name is typically spelled al-Awlaki in major newspapers, but for consistency I
use the spelling used in the judgment.
159. Mark Mazzetti et al., C.I.A. Strike Kills U.S.-Born Militant in a Car in Yemen, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2011, at A1. Also killed were Samir Khan, an American-Pakistani dual
national who published an English language online magazine called ―Inspire‖ for al-Qaeda.
Id.
160. See, e.g., Tom Leonard, Barack Obama Orders Killing of US Cleric Anwar alAwlaki, THE TELEGRAPH, Apr. 7, 2010.
161. Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 8.
162. Id. at 12.
163. Id. at 35, 52.
164. Id. at 35, 37, 40.
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recognizing that extrajudicial killing does constitute a violation of the
kind of well-established and widely accepted principle of customary
international law that is required by Sosa to ground a claim under the
ATS, and it noted that this proposition had been accepted in several
other cases.165 In this sense, then, the claim advanced was entirely
―cognizable‖ in ATS terms.
Judge Bates went on to decide, however, that while the
extrajudicial killing might itself be actionable under the ATS, the
threat of such a killing did not constitute a violation of customary
international law, and so no relief could be had under the ATS.166
This conclusion seems absurd. The application was for an injunction
to prevent the commission of an act that the court acknowledged to
be a violation of law that is cognizable and actionable under the legal
system in question. The injunction was to prevent that act, not the
threat of such, and so it is the act that grounds the claim.
In addition to this argument, however, the court also held that
Nasser Al-Aulaqi could not bring the claim under the ATS on behalf
of his son Anwar, since Anwar Al-Aulaqi was a U.S. citizen in
addition to being Yemeni, and the ATS is limited to claims by
aliens.167 This argument ignored the fact that Anwar Al-Aulaqi was
also a Yemeni national, and his legitimate claim to foreign nationality
could, arguably, have satisfied the ―alien‖ requirement of the ATS.
But that aside, there is some irony here: for in Kiobel it was said that
the parties have an insufficient connection with the United States to
ground a claim under the ATS,168 while here in Al-Aulaqi the court in
part dismissed the case on the argument that the petitioner had too
great a connection to the United States.169
In the final result, of course, the claim was dismissed, no
injunction was issued, and Nasser Al-Aulaqi‘s son was killed, as
feared, some ten months later (Anwar Al-Aulaqi‘s sixteen-year-old
son was similarly killed in a separate drone attack in Yemen a couple
165. Id. at 36 (citing Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 377, 383 n.4
(S.D.N.Y. 2009); Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1178–79
(C.D. Cal. 2005); Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 241–45 (2d Cir. 1995); Forti v. SuarezMason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1542 (N.D. Cal. 1987)).
166. Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 36.
167. Id. at 39.
168. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
169. Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 39.
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of weeks thereafter.)170 In the introduction to his opinion, Judge Bates
noted that the case raised a number of what he called ―stark and
perplexing questions,‖ among which he included the question of
whether ―the Executive [can] order the assassination of a U.S. citizen
without first affording him any form of judicial process whatsoever,
based on the mere assertion that he is a dangerous member of a
terrorist organization?‖ and ―how does the evolving AQAP relate to
core al Qaeda for purposes of assessing the legality of targeting
AQAP (or its principles) under the [AUMF]?‖171 He concluded,
however, that none of these questions could be addressed given that
the case had to be dismissed on grounds of non-justiciability.172
As a lower court bound by the technical doctrines on standing,
that may have been entirely correct. But the questions remain, and
they relate to my broader consideration of the extraterritorial
application of U.S. law. The killing of a person within the territory of
another state, as an act both implementing and said to be authorized
by one‘s own domestic law, is certainly an extreme example of the
exercise of both prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction. Some will
say that it was an act of war authorized by international law, but I
will address below why a court would have good reason to question
that proposition. Similarly, some instances of targeted killing are said
to have been consented to by the host government—the
administration claims this to have been the case with the killing of
Al-Aulaqi. Consent of the government affects the self-defense and jus
ad bellum claims, but in the context of an armed conflict, in which
the law of armed conflict applies, such consent does not affect the
law of armed conflict analysis of whether it is lawful to kill a
person.173 Regardless of consent, there must be an armed conflict in
existence for there to be any justification for the killing under the law
of armed conflict, and the killing must comply with the law of armed
conflict. And in a non-armed conflict situation, consent is only
meaningful if the consenting government could have itself lawfully
killed the person, in similar fashion, under its own domestic laws and

170. Conor Friedersdorf, How Team Obama Justifies the Killing of a 16-Year-Old
American, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 24, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/
10/how-team-obama-justifies-the-killing-of-a-16-year-old-american/264028/.
171. Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 9.
172. Id.
173. Cf. Craig Martin, Going Medieval: Targeted Killing, Self-Defense and the Jus ad
Bellum Regime, in TARGETED KILLINGS: LAW AND MORALITY IN AN ASYMMETRICAL WORLD
223, 233–34 (Claire Finkelstein et al. eds., 2012) (discussing the issue of consent as it
applies to jus ad bellum).
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under international human rights law. Moreover, there is no question
that the governments of Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia have objected
to many of the targeted killing strikes within their territory. 174 As
such, there can be little question that this constitutes an
extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction, and it is difficult to imagine
an exercise of jurisdiction more likely to cause friction and conflict
than this. Why, then, was the question of extraterritoriality not even
raised in the Al-Aulaqi case? Of course, there will be some that will
argue that there are good reasons why the courts would not need to
consider such issues. It is to those arguments that I turn next.
IV. QUALIFICATIONS AND OBJECTIONS
A number of objections could be raised to the argument that
these GWOT cases illustrate the exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction, and that the courts, if they are indeed concerned about
extraterritoriality, should have examined this issue more closely in
these cases. As discussed earlier, there are three primary reasons that
courts would have no cause to inquire into whether an exercise of
jurisdiction is an impermissibly extraterritorial application of law:
first, that the action is not an exercise of U.S. jurisdiction at all, since
it is really an implementation of international law; second, that the
conduct falls within one of the exceptions to the international law
prohibition on the extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction; or third,
Congress explicitly intended that the law be implemented
extraterritorially, and thus the presumptions against extraterritoriality,
and the Charming Betsy doctrine, do not apply or are overcome. A
variant on the third argument, specific to the GWOT cases, might be
that the Executive is permitted to engage in the impugned conduct
under the Commander-in-Chief power under the Constitution, and
thus no congressionial authority is required and the presumptions do
not apply. These arguments form the basis for the three most likely
objections to the suggestion that we should be more concerned about
174. See David E. Sanger & Eric Schmitt, As Rift Deepens, Kerry has a Warning for
Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2011, at A16; Greg Bruno, U.S. Drone Activities in Pakistan,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (July 19, 2010), http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/us-droneactivities-pakistan/p22659#p6. Similarly, there are questions regarding Yemen‘s consent to
strikes. See Mark Mazzetti, U.S. Is Intensifying a Secret Campaign of Yemen Airstrikes, N.Y.
TIMES, June 9, 2011, at A6. Strikes in Somalia have occurred when there has been
insufficient central authority to provide meaningful consent. See Mark Mazzetti & Eric
Schmitt, U.S. Expands its Drone War Into Somalia, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2011, at A1.
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the extraterritorial application of U.S. law that is reflected in the
GWOT cases. In this section I will briefly explore the contours of
these objections and the possible responses to them.
A.

International, Not Domestic Law

I begin with the first likely objection, that some of the impugned
conduct by the United States is authorized by the international law of
armed conflict, and thus constitutes an enforcement of international
law rather than the extraterritorial application of U.S. law. First, it
bears noting that this argument would be rather ironic in the context
of our discussion of Kiobel. Recall the argument that I made earlier,
based on the analysis of several experts on the issue, that the
operation of the ATS is itself an enforcement of international law
principles and thus should not be understood as an exercise of
prescriptive jurisdiction.175 That argument is far truer of the ATS than
it is for the exercises of jurisdiction considered above in the GWOT
cases. But, of course, the Kiobel Court rejected that argument as it
relates to the ATS.176 If the standards applied in Kiobel were
employed here, this argument should surely fail.
Leaving that irony aside, however, there is a strong argument
that the conduct giving rise to the GWOT cases here under
consideration cannot be justified by international law, or be
understood as an implementation of international law. Beginning
with torture, the prohibition on torture is a jus cogens or peremptory
norm of international law, meaning that it cannot be derogated from
under any circumstances.177 So, while the U.S. courts may have
found that such torture was within the ―scope of legitimate
employment‖ of government agents for purposes of the FTCA,178 it
could never be consistent with international law, far less be
understood as implementing it. But aside from torture, some argue
that the detention of ―enemy combatants‖ at Guantánamo Bay,
Bagram, and elsewhere, as well as the targeted killing of ―enemy
combatants‖ with missiles fired from drones within the territory of
countries such as Yemen, Pakistan, and Somalia, is justified by and
conducted in accordance with the international law of armed conflict.
This argument suffers a number of serious problems, which I briefly
175. See supra Part II.C.
176. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664–66 (2013).
177. See supra note 44.
178. Rasul v. Myers (Rasul I), 512 F.3d 644 (D.C. Cir. 2008), vacated, 555 U.S. 1083
(2008); see also supra text accompanying notes 115–117.
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review.
I begin by looking in more detail at the government‘s legal
justification for the targeted killing program, as this rationale is more
fully developed, but it would apply similarly to the authority for
detaining those captured outside the hot battlefields of Afghanistan
and Iraq. The justification was developed in several legal memoranda
from the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice. These
have yet to be publicly disclosed, and the Obama Administration
continues to resist disclosure of the memos, both in court179 and in its
relations with Congress.180 Our best information comes from a leaked
Department of Justice White Paper summarizing the legal
arguments.181 It argues that the legal justification rests on two
foundations. First, that the United States is in a transnational armed
conflict with al-Qaeda and ―associated forces,‖ as authorized under
domestic law by the AUMF, and that the United States is therefore
permitted to kill members of those armed organizations as
combatants under the international law of armed conflict. Second,
and in any event, the United States may kill such persons as an
exercise of the right of self-defense as provided for in Article 51 of
the UN Charter.182
I will focus on the ―armed conflict‖ argument, as the selfdefense claim implicates the jus ad bellum regime, which governs the
use of force against states. While this self-defense justification also
suffers deep flaws, that argument is less relevant to the inquiry
here.183 It only relates to the targeted killing program, not the
detention cases, but even in the case of targeted killing, even if the
use of force is so justified, the specific targeting is still governed by
the law of armed conflict. Thus, the more relevant justification, for
both the targeted killing program and the detention cases, is that the
179. See N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, 915 F. Supp. 2d 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
180. Scott Shane & Mark Mazzetti, White House Tactic for C.I.A. Bid Holds Back Drone
Memos, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2013, at A1.
181. U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, LAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL OPERATION DIRECTED AGAINST A
U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL LEADER OF AL-QA‘IDA OR AN ASSOCIATED
FORCE (2011) [hereinafter DOJ WHITE PAPER], available at http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint
/doj-lethal.pdf.
182. Id. at 1–2.
183. See Martin, supra note 173 (containing my own analysis of the extent to which the
targeted killing program cannot be justified under the doctrine of self-defense and thus
frequently leads to the use of force in violation of the jus ad bellum regime).
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United States is in an armed conflict, and that these actions are thus
authorized by and are consistent with the international law of armed
conflict. But the question of whether a state can be in a
―transnational‖ non-international armed conflict with non-state actors
such as al-Qaeda and AQAP is an issue that must be determined in
accordance with the criteria provided for within in the international
law of armed conflict itself.184 Many international law scholars,
organizations, and institutions relevant to the law of armed conflict,
have rejected the claim that the United States can be in an armed
conflict with non-state actors such as AQAP, in a battlefield that
extends to wherever in the world that its members happen to be, and
in particular, to the territory of states in which the United States is not
otherwise involved as a belligerent in an armed conflict.185
In short, the argument is that the interaction with these
amorphous terrorist groups, which are typically characterized by an
atomized and anonymized cell structure, does not satisfy the essential
criteria for determining the existence of an armed conflict, namely:
(1) that the armed groups have a sufficient level of organization and
structure; (2) that the conflict between such organized armed groups
and the state is characterized by protracted military hostilities of
sufficient intensity and duration; and (3) that such hostilities have
some geographical or spatial limitation.186 The United States simply
cannot be in a global armed conflict with whichever group it defines
as hostile, wherever members of such groups happen to be. The
ramifications of this objection are clear. If a killing or detention is
undertaken in a situation that does not constitute an armed conflict,
then the law of armed conflict does not apply, and the conduct cannot
184. Those criteria are captured in what is known as the Tadić test. Prosecutor v. Tadić,
Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction,
¶ 70 (Int‘l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995); see also Dapo Akande,
Classification of Armed Conflicts: Relevant Legal Concepts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS 32–35 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst ed., 2012). See generally
LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT (2002); ANTHONY CULLEN, THE
CONCEPT OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
(2010).
185. See, e.g., Jakob Kellenberger, President of the Int‘l Comm. of the Red Cross,
Confronting Complexity Through Law: The Case for Reason, Vision and Humanity, Grotius
Lecture at the American Society of International Law (Mar. 28, 2012), available at
http://intercrossblog.icrc.org/blog/kellenberger-grotius-lecture-asil-case-reason-vision-andhumanity; Marco Sassoli, Transnational Armed Groups and International Humanitarian
Law (Harvard Univ. Program on Humanitarian Policy & Conflict Research Occasional Paper
Series, 2006), available at http://www.hpcrresearch.org/sites/default/files/publications/Occas
ionalPaper6.pdf.
186. These are the three criteria of the Tadić test. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, ¶ 70.
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be justified as being authorized by, or being an implementation of,
the law of armed conflict.
The problems do not end there for the argument that the GWOT
cases arise from conduct that is authorized by international law, as
opposed to being an exercise of U.S. jurisdiction. Suppose for the
sake of argument that there is such an armed conflict with al-Qaeda
and associated forces, or conversely that there is a non-international
armed conflict in Yemen or Pakistan, in which the United States is
providing assistance to the government, or indeed that the United
States is using force against such states in self-defense. Even in that
situation, individuals such as Anwar Al-Aulaqi could still not be
classified as ―combatants,‖ who could thus be killed at any time on
the basis of such status. First, the concept of ―combatant,‖ as defined
in the Geneva Conventions, is limited to international armed
conflict.187 In an international armed conflict, only combatants as
defined may be targeted on the basis of status alone. And regardless
of the type of armed conflict, persons not coming within the
definition of combatant under the Geneva Conventions,188 even if
they are clearly members of a terrorist organization, would be
considered civilians who can only be targeted ―for such time as they
are taking direct part in hostilities.‖189 That is, they can only be
targeted on the basis of their conduct, not on the basis of their status.
The Israeli Supreme Court, in considering a challenge to Israel‘s own
targeted killing program, confirmed this proposition and rejected
arguments that Hamas terrorists could be targeted at will on the basis
of some new status of ―unlawful enemy combatants.‖190
These objections, of course, echo the question raised by Judge
Bates in Al Maqaleh as to whether a person could be killed merely on
187. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 43(2), June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; see also GARY SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT 187–91 (2010). It should be noted that while the United States is not a party to the
Additional Protocols, and it continues to object to certain specific provisions, it has accepted
that most of the provisions of the treaty, including Article 51(3), constitute customary
international law.
188. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 187, art. 4.
189. Additional Protocol I, supra note 187, art. 51(3).
190. HCJ 769/02 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel
57(6) IsrSC 285 [2005] (Isr.).
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the bare assertion of membership in a group.191 It is true that, in
contrast to the contested status of the detainees in Rasul v. Bush,192
Anwar Al-Aulaqi was a self-professed member of AQAP and was at
minimum a propagandist for that organization, in which role he
helped to inspire radical opposition to the United States.193 But what
is not known is to what extent he was involved in operational aspects
of terrorist attacks, or to what extent he was directly participating in
such attacks, and moreover, whether he was engaging in such activity
so as to truly pose a direct and imminent threat at the time he was
killed.194
A final point to be made with respect to the targeted killing
program is that Al-Aulaqi was killed by a CIA drone strike, as are
many if not most of the ―insurgents‖ and ―militants‖ killed in strikes
in both Yemen and Pakistan. 195 But members of the CIA are not
themselves ―combatants‖ privileged with the authority to kill under
the law of armed conflict. They are themselves civilians rather than
combatants as the term is defined in the Geneva Conventions.196
Even if one accepts that the armed forces of the United States were
authorized to kill Al-Aulaqi and others under the law of armed
conflict, the CIA was certainly not.197 Thus, even here the conduct
191.727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2010); see supra text accompanying note 171.
192. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
193. See, e.g., Mark Mazzetti et al., How a U.S. Citizen Came to Be in America‟s Cross
Hairs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2013, at A1.
194. The word ―imminent‖ here is used in the sense that it is normally understood in the
law of armed conflict and jus ad bellum doctrine of self-defense, not in the highly
unconventional and elastic meaning that is imposed upon it in the DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra
note 181, at 7–8. Imminence is traditionally related to the right of self-defense. See, e.g.,
YORUM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 182–87, 209–10 (2005); CHRISTINE
GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 160–65 (2008); NILS MELTZER,
TARGETED KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 346–53 (2008).
195. There is a division of responsibility between the CIA and the Department of Defense.
See Micha Zenko, Transferring CIA Drone Strikes to the Pentagon, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS (Apr. 2013), http://www.cfr.org/defensehomeland-security/transferring-cia-drone
-strikes-pentagon/p30434.
196. CIA operations are understood to be affected by a number of international legal
norms. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 187, art. 4; Additional Protocol I, supra
note 187, art. 51(3); see also YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 27–33 (2004); SOLIS, supra note 187, at 220–27.
197. This point was highlighted when Harold Koh, then legal counsel to the State
Department, argued that the plan to indict and try Omar Khadr, the Canadian detainee at
Guantánamo Bay, for the ―crime‖ of engaging in hostilities in Afghanistan and killing an
American medic while not a privileged combatant, would mean that he was being prosecuted
for the very same thing that the CIA was currently engaging in. See Scott Horton, The Khadr
Boomerang, HARPER‘S (May 25, 2010, 1:26 PM), http://harpers.org/blog/2010/05/the-khadrboomerang/.
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cannot be said to constitute an implementation of international law,
or to be authorized by international law.
Similar arguments apply to many of the detention cases
discussed above. A number of detainees, such as those that brought
claims in Rasul v. Bush,198 and in Al Maqaleh v. Gates,199 were
nationals of countries that had friendly relations with the United
States, and they were captured in countries other than Afghanistan
and Iraq, with which the United States was not engaged in armed
conflict. The justification for their capture, rendition, interrogation
and indefinite detention without charge is that they are members or
supporters of Al- Qaeda or ―associated forces‖ with which the United
States is in a transnational armed conflict. As discussed above, if that
proposition is unfounded as a matter of international law, then of
course the justification for capturing and detaining them is similarly
flawed. Moreover, as discussed with respect to Al-Aulaqi, even if one
accepts that there can be such a global ―transnational‖ noninternational armed conflict with al-Qaeda and ―associated forces,‖
the capture and detention of persons in neutral states on the basis of
―material support‖ of ―co-belligerent‖ non-state actors, or on the
basis of vaguely understood notions of ―links‖ to such groups, cannot
be supported by the law of armed conflict. Even the D.C. Circuit has
begun to recognize that ―material support for terrorism‖ is not an
offense under the international law of armed conflict.200 If the
detention is said to be authorized exclusively by international law, as
opposed to domestic law (and hence comprising an exercise of
domestic jurisdiction), one would expect some deeper inquiry in
these cases to determine whether the detention in each specific case
was consistent with the provisions of the Geneva Conventions.
Let me pause here to put this discussion into context for the
purposes of my examination of the extraterritorial application of U.S.
law. I am here addressing the potential objection that the government
conduct in the GWOT cases I have discussed was in fact undertaken
pursuant to international law rather than being an exercise of
domestic jurisdiction. The upshot of the foregoing analysis, however,
is that if the international law critics are correct, in that the United
198. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
199. 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
200. See Hamdan v. United States, 696 F.3d 1238, 1251 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (stating that
material support for terrorism is not a war crime under international law).
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States lacks a basis in the law of armed conflict to engage in this type
of targeted killing or detention of individuals captured outside of
theaters of traditional armed conflict, on the basis of their alleged
membership in al-Qaeda or ―associated forces,‖ then such conduct is
a violation of international law in a number of respects, not least of
which being that the targeted killing violates the customary
international law prohibition on extrajudicial killing.201 But the
extrajudicial killing, as well as the capture, interrogation, and
indefinite detention of individuals, if not authorized by international
law, would thus constitute an extraordinary exercise of executive
enforcement jurisdiction extraterritorially. The killing of foreign
nationals, within the territory of a foreign state, for activity that is
undertaken in a foreign state, is an extreme exercise of jurisdiction
abroad, and would violate the international law principles on
jurisdiction.
Within the scope of this Article, I cannot resolve these
arguments relating to the validity of the claim of a transnational
armed conflict with al-Qaeda and ―associated forces,‖ or whether the
targeted killing program and the detention of those captured outside
of Afghanistan might be otherwise legal under international law. But
it is indisputable that the claims are highly controversial. If these
claims were the sole legal basis for detentions, targeted killing, and
the other conduct discussed here, and thus the basis for arguing that
such conduct was not an impermissible exercise of U.S. jurisdiction,
then one would expect that those arguments would have at least been
subjected to some inquiry and consideration by the courts. But the
courts have not taken up this issue. To the extent the issue of whether
the laws of armed conflict apply, the Supreme Court in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld202 did find that there was a non-international armed conflict
in existence in Afghanistan, where Hamdan had been captured.203
And in Hamdan v. United States,204 a later case involving the same
detainee, the D.C. Circuit found that material support for terrorism is
not a war crime under international law.205 But in both Hamdan and
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,206 the Supreme Court was quite careful in
limiting its discussion to the actual armed conflict that was
201. This has been acknowledged by U.S. courts. See supra note 165 and accompanying
text.
202. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
203. Id. at 566–68.
204. 696 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
205. Id. at 1251.
206. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
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indisputably in process in Afghanistan. There has been little other
inquiry into the validity of claims that international law grounds the
actions undertaken elsewhere. Indeed, in Al-Bihani v. Obama,207 the
D.C. Circuit rejected the notion that the international law of armed
conflict should inform in any way the interpretation of the AUMF,
implying that the AUMF was the sole authority for government
action.208
B.

Exceptions to International Law Principles on Jurisdiction

The second possible objection to the suggestion that the
detention and other treatment of foreigners captured abroad is an
impermissible exercise of jurisdiction, is that such conduct falls
within the exceptions to the international law prohibition on the
extraterritorial application of domestic law. The exceptions relevant
here are the objective territorial principle (effects doctrine), the
passive personality principle, and the protective principle. It will be
recalled from the discussion in Part II that the validity and scope of
both the objective territoriality principle (which permits the exercise
of jurisdiction over conduct outside of the territory of the state that
will have substantial effects within its territory), and the passive
personality principle (which permits the exercise of jurisdiction
outside of the territory of the state for the protection of nationals
abroad) are somewhat controversial. The third exception, the
protective principle, is far narrower in scope than is typically
understood. I explore their application here briefly.
The 1935 Harvard Research Draft Convention209 was an early
attempt to develop an international consensus on the limits on the
exercise of domestic jurisdiction under international law. It never
advanced to form the basis of a treaty, but it continues to be referred
to as being important in defining and articulating the scope of a
number of the core concepts developed therein. The passive
personality principle was one of the principles articulated in the Draft
Convention. Nevertheless, a significant segment of the international
community historically has rejected the passive personality

207. 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010), petition for reh‟g en banc denied, 619 F.3d 1 (D.C.
Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011).
208. See id. at 871.
209. Harvard Draft Convention, supra note 23.
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principle.210 It may be argued that regardless of claims by certain
countries, it does not constitute an accepted principle of international
law, though James Crawford notes that ―such objections have not,
however, prevented the development of something approaching a
consensus on the use of passive personality in certain cases, often
linked to international terrorism.‖211 That assertion notwithstanding,
it is a principle that the United States itself traditionally has opposed
and rejected in areas not related to terrorism, and its own attempts to
employ the passive personality in certain kinds of terrorism cases has
met with criticism both at home and abroad.212
In any event, even if the principle is accepted as being
recognized, the narrow range of cases in which the exercise of
jurisdiction may be permissible under the passive personality
principle would be limited to those involving criminal prosecution or
civil actions in regular courts for deliberate terrorist attacks aimed at
the state‘s nationals abroad. These would involve judicial
proceedings in the kinds of cases that are least likely to provoke the
objection of the other sovereign states implicated.213 The acceptance
of this narrow exercise of jurisdiction relies not only on the universal
condemnation of the kind of terrorist act in question, but also the
improbability that such exercise of jurisdiction would lead to
unlimited or unexpected criminal liability.214 As discussed above, one
of the recurring problems in the GWOT cases is the considerable
uncertainty regarding the process by which individuals have been
identified for detention, targeting, or otherwise been made subject to
the exercise of U.S. jurisdiction, together with the very limited degree
of judicial oversight to determine whether the initial identification
was justified.215 Moreover, almost invariably they arise from
suspicion of involvement with certain groups, rather than prosecution

210. Robbins, supra note 23, at 10–11.
211. CRAWFORD, supra note 21, at 461; see O‘CONNELL, supra note 25, at 828–29;
ANDREW CLAPHAM, BRIERLY‘S LAW OF NATIONS 243 (7th ed. 2012); Watson, supra note 25,
at 14–15, 30.
212. Robinson, supra note 25, at 487–89, 496; Robbins, supra note 23, at 10–11.
213. For instance, the line of foreign sovereign immunity cases against Iran for damages
arising from its vicarious liability for the terrorist activities of groups such as Hezbollah. See,
e.g., Belkin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 667 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Another
example can be found in the prosecutions for hijackings, which have drawn support from the
universal condemnation reflected in the anti-hijacking conventions. See, e.g., United States
v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896 (D.D.C. 1988), aff‟d, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
214. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. at 902.
215. Denbeaux & Denbeaux, supra note 132, at 2–3, 38–39; see also supra text
accompanying notes 99–100.
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for terrorist attacks already conducted. Finally, they do not involve
adjudication in regular courts, but rather detention without charge,
torture, and extrajudicial killing.
The objective territoriality principle has been embraced by the
United States to justify, among other things, the extraterritorial
application of antitrust law.216 But this principle too is not widely
accepted in international law, and to the extent that it is accepted, it
tends to be narrowly construed. Even under the more recent U.S.
formulations of the principle, the effect of the conduct within the
United States must be substantial and direct.217 While it might be
permissible to extend jurisdiction under this test to those members of
al-Qaeda who had been involved in the 9/11 attacks, the same cannot
be said for the seizure and detention of persons on scant evidence that
they have some level of affiliation with, or are providing some level
of ―material support‖ to, terrorist groups said to be associated with alQaeda.218 This is all the more so for members of groups like alShabaab, which most acknowledge are locally focused, and pose no
direct threat to the United States.219
Turning to the protective principle, it contemplates the legitimate
extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction in respect of conduct by
foreigners abroad that pose a direct and substantial threat to the
national security of the state. Once again, U.S. courts have at times
construed this principle in the broadest possible terms, to justify such
conduct as the criminal prosecution of foreigners for murder
committed abroad in the course of international narcotics trading.220

216. See supra note 55.
217. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 402, 403 (1987); Morrison v. Nat‘l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2889–90 (2010). In
United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2003), the Second Circuit relied upon the
principle to support the prosecution of foreign terrorists plotting to destroy foreign aircraft
with no American passengers, flying between third states, though the primary ground was
that Congress intended the statute in question to have extraterritorial effect.
218. On the problems with the determination process, and the deference courts have
shown the evidentiary standards, see supra Part III.B–C.
219. See, e.g., Jonathan Masters, Al-Shabaab, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Feb. 5,
2013), http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabaab/p18650. But see Al Shabaab: Recruitment and
Radicalization within the Muslim American Community and the Threat to the Homeland:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Security, 112th Cong. 204 (2011) (statement of
Chairman Peter T. King).
220. United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 1994), is a prime example of
this. The case involved the prosecution of Mexican nationals for the torture and murder of
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But it is important to emphasize that from its first articulation in the
Harvard Research Draft Convention in 1935,221 the international law
perspective on the protective principle was that it permits the exercise
of prescriptive jurisdiction (and of course adjudicative jurisdiction)
with respect to crimes committed by a foreigner against the security,
territorial integrity, or political independence of the state.222 This
formulation is construed narrowly to mean that the crime triggering
the right to exercise jurisdiction must be directed at, and threaten the
integrity of, government functions and the institutions of the state,
rather than purely civilian targets.223
Perhaps ironically, it has been the U.S. and U.K. legal systems
that were traditionally viewed as maintaining the most restrictive
view of the protective principle.224 Moreover, this exception for the
exercise of jurisdiction is fundamentally understood to be for the
purpose of criminal prosecution for crimes already committed. This
emphasis is reflected in the Harvard Draft Convention, which
contains limitations relating to double jeopardy, trials in absentia, and
guarantees of fair and impartial trials of the accused by regularly
constituted courts, as well as protection against cruel, unusual or
inhuman punishments thereafter.225 Thus, again, the prosecution in
federal courts of the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks on the Pentagon,
being an institution of the state, would clearly fall within the scope of
the exception. But the exercise of prescriptive and enforcement
jurisdiction in the indefinite detention, interrogation, prosecution in
military commissions, and extrajudicial killing of individuals who are
suspected of involvement in terrorist attacks on civilians would
clearly not come within the established scope of the principle. That
two Americans in Mexico under the mistaken belief that they were DEA agents. The Ninth
Circuit sought to support its extraterritorial application of the relevant criminal statute by
relying in part on the protective principle, characterizing it as permitting the extraterritorial
application of U.S. law to conduct that ―may impinge on the territorial integrity, security, or
political independence of the United States.‖ Id. at 840. That is not an accurate statement of
the principle, nor could it justify the exercise of jurisdiction to prosecute the murder of
nationals abroad. Even had the victims been DEA officials, their murder would not have
constituted a threat to the security of the United States sufficient to trigger the protective
principle.
221. Harvard Draft Convention, supra note 23.
222. See id. at 543.
223. See id. at 557; see also Robbins, supra note 23, at 10; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402, cmt. f (1987). But see CRAWFORD,
supra note 21, at 462.
224. See Harvard Draft Convention, supra note 23; Robbins, supra note 23, at 1223–25.
225. Harvard Draft Convention, supra note 23, at 596–601 (containing Article 12 of the
Draft Convention, describing the prosecution and punishment of aliens).
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may strike many as being bizarre, and a good reason for thinking that
the international law principles on jurisdiction are out of date and in
need of adjustment. But these are the principles that the Court
purported to be concerned with in the oral argument in Kiobel, and
indeed to which Justice Breyer referred in his concurring opinion.226
What is more, unless one fully accepts the international law of
armed conflict justifications for the targeted killing and indefinite
detention of those captured beyond any theater of armed conflict,
such acts of extrajudicial killing and arbitrary detention without
charge constitute a most extreme form of enforcement jurisdiction in
apparent violation of long-established principles at the foundation of
the rule of law. This would militate against any justifications
grounded in any of these three principles of jurisdiction. One cannot
imagine for a moment that the United States would accept such
arguments were the Chinese to take to launching operations within
the territory of neighboring countries to kill Uighur ―militants‖ said
to be plotting attacks against China from safe-houses abroad, or
detaining nationals of third states captured abroad for ―material
support‖ for the Uighurs. Consider the international reaction to the
suspected Israeli killing of the Hamas leader Mahmoud al-Mabhouh
in Dubai in 2010,227 or the poisoning of former Russian FSB/KGB
agent Alexander Litvinenko in London in 2006, thought to be
conducted by agents of the Kremlin.228 There was no talk then of
such actions being justifiable exercises of jurisdiction under the
protective or objective territorial principles.
C. Congressionial Authority and the Presumptions
The third objection is that the conduct in question in these cases
was explicitly authorized by Congress, and thus the twin
presumptions—that is, the presumption against extraterritoriality, and

226. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1671 (2013) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in the judgment). Though it is submitted that his assertion that the United States
could exercise jurisdiction in the event that U.S. interests were sufficiently implicated, this is
not consistent with the international law principles to which he refers.
227. See, e.g., Ian Black & Rory McCarthy, Mystery over Dubai Killing of Hamas Official
Deepens, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 24, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010 /feb/24/mos
sad-hamas-dubai-passports.
228. See, e.g., Esther Addley, Alexander Litvinenko: Coroner Urges Public Inquiry into
Death, THE GUARDIAN, June 5, 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/05/alex
ander-litvinenko-coroner-public-inquiry1.
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the Charming Betsy doctrine, which essentially presumes that
Congress does not intend to violate international law—have quite
simply been overcome by clear congressionial intent. In other words,
the conduct may indeed constitute the extraterritorial application of
U.S. law, and the resulting exercise of prescriptive and enforcement
jurisdiction may be in violation of the international law principles of
jurisdiction, and indeed violate other substantive principles of
international law; but the courts need not consider such issues if
Congress has explicitly authorized the conduct with clear intent that it
apply in precisely that way, in respect of foreign persons for conduct
undertaken in foreign territory.
There are a number of responses to this objection. It is useful to
begin by recalling that both presumptions flow from a respect for
both international law and the sovereign autonomy of foreign legal
systems, and an understanding that the United States would typically
avoid engaging in conduct that either violated international law or
was likely to impinge on the sovereignty of another state or cause
conflicts with foreign laws. The presumptions are in fact interrelated,
since even without an explicit presumption against extraterritoriality,
the Charming Betsy doctrine militates against the interpretation of a
statute so as to apply extraterritorially in violation of the international
law principles on jurisdiction.
The corollary to the presumptions, of course, is that where
Congress clearly intends a law to apply extraterritorially, or where
the statute cannot be construed in a manner that is consistent with
principles of international law,229 then the legislation will be given
effect regardless of extraterritorial application or inconsistency with
international law.230 But one of the problems that has dogged this
doctrine is the uneven standards that the courts have applied in
229. This overly simplifies the issue of course. If the principle is in a treaty to which the
United States is a party, which is more recent in time than the statute, and the principle is
found in a provision that is construed to be self-executing, then of course the treaty provision
may be held to defeat the statutory provision. See U.S. CONST. art. VII; RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115(2) (1987). See
generally LORI DAMROSCH ET AL., PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 685 (2009).
230. See United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 92 (2d Cir. 2003) (―[W]hile customary
international law may inform the judgment of our courts in an appropriate case, it cannot
alter or constrain the making of law by the political branches of government . . . .‖); United
States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (―Yunis seeks to portray international
law as a self-executing code that trumps domestic law whenever the two conflict. That effort
misconceives the role of judges as appliers of international law and as participants in the
federal system. Our duty is to enforce the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United
States, not to conform the law of the land to norms of customary international law.‖).
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assessing the ―clear congressionial intent.‖ This, of course, turns out
to be one of the core issues in the Court‘s majority decision in Kiobel
itself. Thus, as already briefly discussed, the Court has in the past
searched for ―implicit intent‖ in extending the reach of antitrust law
and other statutes to conduct overseas. It has done so by adopting
functional and instrumentalist approaches; thus in United States v.
Bowman,231 a pre-World War II case, the Court held that a statute
criminalizing conspiracy to defraud a U.S.-owned corporation must
apply to conduct undertaken on the high seas, since to find otherwise
would vastly limit the utility of the statute and create ―a large
immunity for frauds as easily committed by citizens on the high seas
and in foreign countries as at home.‖232
We now know that the Court in Kiobel rejected any such
functional or instrumentalist approach to the inquiry into whether
there was congressionial intent that the ATS apply extraterritorially.
Of course, as Chief Justice Roberts himself noted, the Court in Kiobel
was, strictly speaking, not even assessing whether the ATS ought to
apply extraterritorially, but whether Congress intended courts to
exercise the jurisdiction granted under the ATS in a manner that
would have extraterritorial effect.233 But in any event, in conducting
that inquiry, the Court applied a very strict rule of interpretation,
holding that ―to rebut the presumption, the ATS would need to evince
a ‗clear indication of extraterritoriality.‘‖234 It went on to find that the
ATS ―covers actions by aliens for violations of the law of nations, but
that does not imply extraterritorial reach.‖235 The Court brushed aside
the fact that the Congress of 1789 clearly intended the ATS to apply
to piracy,236 which as Justice Breyer convincingly demonstrated in
the minority concurring opinion, is quite clearly extraterritorial.237 It
similarly dismissed historical evidence regarding congressionial
intent, stating that Attorney General Bradford‘s 1795 opinion
regarding ATS claims arising from U.S. involvement in a French raid

231. 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
232. Id. at 98.
233. Chief Justice Roberts notes this in his majority opinion in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
234. Id. at 1665.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
237. Id. at 1672–74.
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on the British fort at Sierra Leone defied a ―definitive reading.‖238
Such strict standards for assessing whether there was explicit
congressionial authority to implement a law extraterritorially, or in a
manner inconsistent with international law, stands in stark contrast to
the manner in which the courts have considered such issues in the
GWOT cases that I have considered here. As I have discussed, the
courts have seldom even adverted to the question of whether the
conduct constitutes an extraterritorial application of U.S. law. Now,
to be sure, it is obvious that the AUMF itself is intended to apply
beyond the territory of the United States. Its primary purpose is to
authorize the use of force abroad. So it might be argued that courts
have naturally not adverted to the extraterritorial aspect of conduct
said to be authorized by the AUMF. But as I have argued, it is not at
all clear that much of the conduct that gave rise to the cases
considered here was in fact authorized by the AUMF. And given that
lack of clarity, combined with the fact that the conduct was an
extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction, and potentially inconsistent
with principles of international law, one would have expected the
courts to have probed the question more deeply, and to have applied
the kind of standards that the Court did in Kiobel—if, indeed, the
courts are really concerned with adherence to principles of
international law and avoiding conflicts with other legal systems.
The reasons why the conduct here under consideration may not
have been explicitly authorized by the AUMF or any other legislation
have been addressed above. On a purely textual reading of the statute,
it cannot extend to the capture, interrogation, and detention of
persons who were seized in Thailand, or the killing of persons in
Yemen, Somalia, or Pakistan, who were not members of al-Qaeda or
some organization that planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
9/11 terrorist attacks.239 Moreover, the process by which persons
have been determined to be ―enemy combatants‖ in the detention
context is flawed, while in the targeted killing context it remains
entirely unknown. In the end, the courts have not applied the kind of
strict interpretation seen in the Court‘s construction of the ATS in
Kiobel, in assessing the explicit statutory authority to engage in this
conduct within the GWOT.

238. Id. at 1668 (majority opinion).
239. At least not before the enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, 125 Stat. 1298 (2011), which is understood to have
expanded the scope of the authority to use force beyond that provided in the AUMF.
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One final point needs to be addressed regarding the issue of
domestic authority. Some might argue that even if this impugned
conduct is not explicitly authorized by Congress, it comes within the
Commander-in-Chief authority of the President, pursuant to Article
II, Section 2 of the Constitution.240 This of course implicates an old
and very contentious debate over the war powers under the
Constitution of the United States, and the exact contours of executive
and legislative control over decisions to use military force.241 Without
delving into the particulars of that debate, I would suggest that the
better view is that the President has authority to decide how and
where to employ military force within an armed conflict, but cannot
initiate armed conflict or use force against another state without
congressionial approval.242 In the context of my arguments above, the
first point to be made is that the courts in none of these GWOT cases
even look to Commander-in-Chief authority. But in any event, within
the context of the detention, torture, and targeted killing debate, once
again we come back to the question of whether such conduct was
legitimately part of an armed conflict or not. If it is not, then of
course one could argue that the Commander-in-Chief power does not
authorize detaining or killing someone in a foreign country, though
the more hawkish advocates of executive power would disagree. But
in any event, even the strongest advocates of more aggressive
positions on war powers and the Commander-in-Chief authority
acknowledge that there is deep disagreement, and no settled position
on the issue.243 Thus, precisely because the issues surrounding war
powers remain contentious and are unsettled, one would expect the
courts to make some inquiry into whether the conduct in question
might have nonetheless required congressionial authorization, and if
240. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 1.
241. See, e.g., LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER (2d ed. 2004); THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION AND THE POWER TO GO TO WAR (Gary M. Stern & Morton H. Halperin eds.,
1994); JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005); John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The
Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167, 242–52 (1996); JOHN HART
ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH
(1993).
242. I have previously written about war powers under the U.S. Constitution. See Martin,
supra note 49, at 36–38, 58–61.
243. See Jide Nzelibe & John Yoo, Rational War and Constitutional Design, 115 YALE
L.J. 2512 (2006). But see FISHER, supra note 241, at 15 (arguing that Yoo, as the most
aggressive advocate of executive war powers, is virtually alone in his interpretation of the
intent of the drafters of the war powers clause of the Constitution).
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so, whether Congress had provided authority that unambiguously
applied to the circumstances in the particular case.
V. CONCLUSIONS – KIOBEL AND THE ―GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR‖
This examination of extraterritoriality in a small sample of
GWOT cases is all too brief and admittedly incomplete. But let us
recall the reason for the exploration. The primary purpose for this
study of GWOT cases was to examine how the federal courts have
considered issues of extraterritoriality in other cases involving claims
regarding violations of jus cogens norms in international law. In other
words, it began as an inquiry aimed at providing some insight into the
Court‘s reasons for delving into the issues of extraterritoriality in
Kiobel. In so doing, however, the inquiry, brief and incomplete as it
may be, has raised some significant questions about the approach of
the federal courts in the GWOT cases. In essence, the inquiry began
with the thought that GWOT cases might shed light on Kiobel, but in
the end, the inquiry through the lens of the Kiobel judgment may
shed some light on our approach to the GWOT, and may contribute
to beginning a fruitful discussion on some under-evaluated aspects of
the GWOT policies and jurisprudence.
Why this inquiry to begin with? How and why would the GWOT
cases shed any light on the Court‘s approach to Kiobel? The starting
point was that the Court‘s diversion into the issue of extraterritoriality
was odd. There is good reason to believe that the ATS does not
constitute an extraterritorial application of U.S. law, or to be more
precise, an exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction in violation of the
international law principles on jurisdiction, or domestic presumptions
against extraterritoriality. The Court‘s own interpretation of the ATS
in Sosa supports the view that the ATS is purely a grant of
jurisdiction to federal courts to recognize and adjudicate causes of
action in tort for violations of international law. Such exercise of
adjudicative jurisdiction, particularly in relation to violations of jus
cogens norms in respect of which international law recognizes
universal jurisdiction in any event, is entirely consistent with
international law principles on jurisdiction. The fact that there is little
or no connection to the United States in so-called foreign-cubed cases
does not significantly alter this analysis.
The next step was to consider how the Court, and the federal
courts generally, have treated extraterritoriality in relation to other
cases involving claims arising from violations of the same jus cogens
norms that were at issue in Kiobel, but in which there is a greater
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U.S. connection. The government‘s conduct in the so-called GWOT
has given rise to a number of cases in which there were precisely
such claims regarding the violation of international law prohibitions
on indefinite and arbitrary detention, torture, and extrajudicial killing,
and in which there was a much stronger U.S. connection. Several of
these cases involved claims under the ATS itself. The examination of
these cases, however, ended up revealing some surprising and
important features about the government‘s conduct in the GWOT,
and about how the federal courts have treated such conduct, and even
how the relevant bar and the academy have understood the policy and
resulting jurisprudence. These observations are significant in their
own right, quite apart from Kiobel, and they can be reduced to a few
key points.
First, the conduct of the U.S. government that gave rise to the
claims in these cases—that is the capture of foreigners in foreign
lands and then subjecting them to indefinite detention, the
interrogation and torture of several of such detainees, and the
extrajudicial killing of persons in foreign territory in which the
United States is not involved in armed conflict—itself constitutes the
extraterritorial application of U.S. law. Or, to put it more precisely, it
constitutes the exercise of U.S. prescriptive and enforcement
jurisdiction with respect to foreigners in foreign territory. Moreover,
in several of these instances, this extraterritorial exercise of
jurisdiction is arguably in violation of the international law principles
on jurisdiction; the conduct cannot be said to constitute the
implementation of, or be authorized by, the international law of
armed conflict; and the congressionial authority for such conduct has
been less than certain, meaning that the domestic presumptions apply
and have not been rebutted.
Second, the courts, including the Supreme Court, in considering
these cases, have not analyzed the question of whether such conduct
represents an impermissibly extraterritorial application of U.S. law.
Indeed, the question is virtually never raised. Rather, to the extent
that extraterritoriality is raised as an issue in these cases, all the focus
is on whether various rights under U.S. law can be applied
extraterritorially to protect foreigners who are made subject to the
exercise of U.S. jurisdiction in foreign territory. In light of this
inquiry, I find this feature in particular to be strange: that courts
should be so concerned with the question of extraterritorial
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application of rights, and go so far as to express apprehension over
the possibility that extending rights to foreigners in the grips of U.S.
power in foreign territory might cause friction in foreign relations or
infringe international law principles on jurisdiction; while at the same
time being so entirely oblivious of the fact that the government‘s
conduct in detaining, torturing, and killing those foreigners in foreign
lands should itself constitute egregious exercises of U.S. jurisdiction
in violation of not only principles of jurisdiction, but also
fundamental human rights principles under international law.
Moreover, it is interesting to note that the academic literature on the
GWOT jurisprudence has similarly focused on the extraterritorial
application of rights, while apparently ignoring the question of
whether the conduct giving rise to the claims is itself an
impermissible exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
The third observation is in relation to the contrasting standards
that are applied in the various contexts. The courts have applied
broad statutory interpretations and generous standards in finding legal
authority (and, by implication, explicit congressionial intent that the
law operate abroad) for the government exercise of jurisdiction in the
GWOT. In some cases, the courts have extended the authority of the
AUMF far beyond what the language can support. In contrast with
that, the Court applied strict and narrow interpretations of the ATS
and employed high standards for establishing congressionial intent in
Kiobel itself. Similarly, the courts employed strict standards of
statutory interpretation and mobilized various doctrines to limit the
extraterritorial reach of habeas corpus and other U.S. legal rights to
claimants under U.S. jurisdiction abroad, as well as for the purpose of
insulating and immunizing U.S. defendants from the claims of such
plaintiffs in the GWOT cases. The manner in which the courts
employed the concept of nexus perhaps reflects the most obvious
disparity. On the one hand, the courts have required a substantial
connection to the United States to ground ATS claims (except in the
case of Al-Aulaqi, in which too great a connection was one basis for
rejecting his claim), have held that the link between the U.S. and
Syrian agents acting on its behalf in torturing a rendered subject was
insufficient to trigger liability, and have required claimants to be
clearly within U.S. territorial jurisdiction in order to avail themselves
of U.S. legal rights. Yet the courts at the same time have accepted the
most tenuous nexus to al-Qaeda, often on the basis of weak and often
dubious evidence, and have even extended the AUMF to persons
unrelated to al-Qaeda and captured in non-conflict countries years
after 9/11 for providing ―material support‖ to amorphous associated
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forces, as the basis for legitimating U.S. government action in
detaining and interrogating claimants.
There are, of course, counter-arguments to my proposition that
U.S. conduct constitutes the exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction, in
likely violation of both U.S. domestic presumptions and international
law principles on jurisdiction. But I have tried to argue that those
objections too can be answered. Some readers may not find my
responses to the ―likely objections‖ persuasive. In other words, it may
be argued that the courts in these cases were entirely right not to
consider extraterritoriality issues, precisely because the conduct was
clearly authorized by Congress in legislation that was explicitly
intended to apply extraterritorially, and in any event it was consistent
with and authorized by the international law of armed conflict, and
came within the exceptions to the international law prohibition on
extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction. In short, the courts were
doctrinally correct, and there was no issue to explore or express
concern over.
Others may think that these cases in fact reflect the kind of ―grey
holes‖ that are created when courts are excessively deferential to
executive power in times of armed conflict or national emergency,
which reflects an unfortunate but inevitable erosion of the thick rule
of law.244 But no matter what one may think on the technical merits
of these decisions, I want to argue that we should nonetheless step
back and consider the broader pattern that this exploration provides.
That is, that U.S. law is being applied extraterritorially in the GWOT
in ways that, quite aside from possibly violating substantive
principles of human rights and humanitarian law, are violating the
international law principles on jurisdiction—the very issue that
purportedly caused the Court such concern in oral argument in
Kiobel. If we care about international law principles on jurisdiction
and are concerned about the extraterritorial application of domestic
law, we should recognize and study further this aspect of the GWOT.
Moreover, it is not only an issue of how the courts have treated this
issue. We should be asking why Congress has not addressed the
244. See Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095
(2009) (suggesting that such grey holes are inevitable in times of crisis); David Dyzenhaus,
Schmitt v. Dicey: Are States of Emergency Inside or Outside the Legal Order? 27 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2005 (2006) (arguing that such gray holes are not inevitable and are to be resisted in
defense of the rule of law).
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question. It may decide to entirely support the conduct here in
question—though in so doing it should consider carefully whether the
conduct complies with U.S. obligations under international law—but
if Congress supports the conduct, it should pass legislation to provide
an explicit legal foundation for it.
In the end, the judgment in Kiobel has left the ATS all but dead
to claimants seeking to enforce rights against foreign defendants, and
many human rights advocates will profoundly regret the decision for
this reason. But the issue of extraterritoriality remains very much
alive, and perhaps the Court‘s judgment in Kiobel will contribute to a
renewed inquiry into the nature and legitimacy of the extraterritorial
exercise of U.S. jurisdiction in the so-called ―global war on terror.‖

